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. 2020 Mar 5;18(3):e3000634.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3000634. eCollection 2020 Mar.

Context effects on probability estimation

Affiliations

Context effects on probability estimation

Wei-Hsiang Lin et al. PLoS Biol. .

Abstract

Many decisions rely on how we evaluate potential outcomes and estimate their corresponding probabilities of occurrence. Outcome evaluation is subjective because it requires consulting internal preferences and is sensitive to context. In contrast, probability estimation requires extracting statistics from the environment and therefore imposes unique challenges to the decision maker. Here, we show that probability estimation, like outcome evaluation, is subject to context effects that bias probability estimates away from other events present in the same context. However, unlike valuation, these context effects appeared to be scaled by estimated uncertainty, which is largest at intermediate probabilities. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) imaging showed that patterns of multivoxel activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) predicted individual differences in context effects on probability estimates. These results establish VMPFC as the neurocomputational substrate shared between valuation and probability estimation and highlight the additional involvement of dACC and IPS that can be uniquely attributed to probability estimation. Because probability estimation is a required component of computational accounts from sensory inference to higher cognition, the context effects found here may affect a wide array of cognitive computations.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Figures

Fig 1
Fig 1. Task design.
(A) Trial sequence. In each trial, subjects were presented with an abstract visual stimulus and had to indicate his or her interval estimate of its reward probability with a button press. A brief written display (0.5 s) then indicated which probability interval estimate the subject had chosen. After a variable ISI (1–7 s), subjects received feedback on whether she or he received a monetary reward. A variable ITI (1–9 s) was implemented before the start of a new trial. In a block of trials, two stimuli each carrying a unique probability of reward appeared repeatedly in random order. (B) Manipulation of context. Context was defined by the stimuli that appeared in a block of trials. There were three contexts (rows in the table), each consisting of two visual stimuli carrying different probabilities of reward. For each probability, there were two different stimuli assigned to it. The two stimuli with the same probability were experienced under two different contexts. This design allowed us to compare how probability estimates were affected by context. (C) Example trial ordering of the three contexts showing how different stimuli with the same probability of reward could be associated with different contexts. ISI, interstimulus interval; ITI, intertrial interval.
Fig 2
Fig 2. The effects of context on probability estimates.
Experiment 1: (A) Subjects’ estimates of probability of reward associated with different stimuli. Stimuli carrying the same reward probability are plotted together. The vertical axis represents interval estimates: 1:[0%–5%], 2:[5%–20%], 3:[20%–35%], 4:[35%–50%], 5:[50%–65%], 6:[65%–80%], 7:[80%–95%], 8:[95%–100%]. The bars represent the mean probability estimates (across subjects), and the tilted black lines represent individual subjects’ data. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. (B) Frequency of reward the subjects experienced during the experiment. Conventions are the same as in Fig 2A. (C) Context-induced difference in probability estimates. For each reward probability—10%, 50%, 90%—the mean difference (across subjects) in probability estimates— Δ10%, Δ50%, Δ90%—between contexts is plotted. In the equations that define Δ10%, Δ50%, and Δ90% shown in the graph, conventions of the color codes for probability estimates (P^) are the same as in Fig 2A. For example, Δ50% is computed by subtracting P^50% (in blue), which represents probability estimate of the 50% reward stimulus in the [50%, 90%] context, from P^50% (in red), which represents probability estimate of the 50% reward stimulus in the [10%, 50%] context. We obtained Δ from each subject based on his or her mean probability estimates (across trials) and computed the mean of Δ across subjects. Error bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence interval of the mean Δ (across subjects). (D) Comparing the size of context effect between different reward probabilities. Bars indicate the mean difference in context effect (across subjects) for stimuli associated with different probabilities. For example, Δ50%−Δ10% compares context effect between 50% reward and 10% reward. Error bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence interval of the mean differences in context effect (across subjects). Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. OS, the other stimulus present in the same context as the stimulus of interest; S, stimulus of interest.
Fig 3
Fig 3. Experiment 1: Choice probability in the post-fMRI lottery decision task was predicted by context-dependent probability estimates in the fMRI session.
(A) Three pairs of options, each representing a choice between two stimuli carrying the same reward probability but experienced in different contexts, are shown. For each pair, we plot the choice probability of the option highlighted in red. Each data point represents choice probability of a single subject. The bar indicates the mean choice probability averaged across all subjects. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. For each pair, we tested whether the mean choice probability is different from 0.5. The red star symbol indicates significant difference in choice probability from 0.5 based on 95% bootstrap confidence interval. (B–D) Relation between choice probability and probability estimate. For each pair of options described above, choice probability is plotted against the difference in probability estimates subjects provided in the fMRI task. Each data point represents a single subject. (B) 10% reward pair. (C) 50% reward pair. (D) 90% reward pair. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m.
Fig 4
Fig 4. Experiment 1: Comparison of trial-by-trial probability estimates between contexts showing how differences in probability estimates between contexts developed during the experiment.
Data includes the pre-fMRI practice session and the fMRI session. (A–C) The scale on the vertical axis indicates interval estimate (from 1 to 8 with 1 representing the smallest probability interval [0%–5%] and 8 representing the largest probability interval [95%–100%]). (A) Comparison of the 10% reward stimuli between contexts. Each data point represents the mean probability estimate of a single trial across subjects. Red: 10% stimulus in the [10%, 50%] context. Blue: 10% stimulus is in the [10%, 90%] context. The colored step function traces represent the corresponding mean frequency of reward the subjects experienced. (B) Comparison of the 50% reward stimuli between contexts. Red: 50% stimulus in the [10%, 50%] context. Blue: 50% stimulus in the [50%, 90%] context. (C) Comparison of the 90% reward stimuli between contexts. Red: 90% stimulus in the [10%, 90%] context. Blue: 90% stimulus in the [50%, 90%] context. The bumps on trial number 21 and 36, seen in Fig 4A and 4C, reflect the beginning of a new block of trials. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Fig 5
Fig 5. A behavioral control experiment (Experiment 2) examining whether context effect and lack thereof on probability estimates found in Experiment 1 was because of the design of the interval-to-button mapping.
Conventions are the same as in Figs 3 and 4. The design of the experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except that there were 10—as opposed to 8—key buttons, each representing a unique interval of probability [0, 1] for the subjects to indicate probability estimates. (A) Probability estimates of the 10% reward stimuli. (B) Probability estimates of the 50% reward stimuli. (C) Probability estimates of the 90% reward stimuli. The scale on the vertical axis indicates interval estimate (from 1 to 10 with 1 representing the smallest probability interval [0%–10%] and 10 representing the largest probability interval [90%–100%]). (D) Choice probability in the lottery decision task following the probability estimation task. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. The red star symbol indicates significant difference in choice probability from 0.5 based on 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m.
Fig 6
Fig 6. Testing the URD model for context-dependent probability estimation.
(A) Illustration of the URD model. (B) Regression analysis. In three separate multiple regression analyses each examining a particular reward probability, we estimated the weight subjects assigned to frequency of reward associated with a stimulus (fS) and the overall frequency of reward associated with the context (foverall) and plot the mean regression coefficients across all subjects. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. The star symbol indicates statistical significance (testing the mean regression coefficient against 0 at p < 0.05). (C) We compare β^fS with (1β^foverall) for each reward probability separately. The vertical axis represents Δ, where Δ=β^fS(1β^foverall). We computed Δ for each subject separately and plot the mean Δ across subjects. Error bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence interval of the mean Δ. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. URD, uncertainty and reference dependent.
Fig 7
Fig 7. Model fitting results: Group average data.
(A) Model comparison. We show BIC value of 8 models. Smaller BIC values indicate better models. Error bars represent 95% bootstrap confidence interval. (B) Model fitting results of the URD models (URD-γ,URD-γ-λ). (C) Model fitting results of the divisive normalization models (DN-1-γ,DN-2-γ) and range normalization model (RN). Each data point (black) in panels B and C represents the mean probability estimate (across all subjects) of a particular trial order. For example, in the [10%, 50%] context, when S is the 50% reward stimulus, OS would be the 10% reward stimulus; when S is the 10% reward stimulus, OS would be the 50% reward stimulus. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. BIC, Bayesian information criterion; DN, divisive normalization; OS, the other stimulus present in the same context as the stimulus of interest; RN, range normalization; S, stimulus of interest; URD, uncertainty and reference dependent.
Fig 8
Fig 8. Model fitting results: Individual data.
(A–B) Results from fitting the models at the individual-subject level. The mean model fits (averaged across subjects) are plotted along with subjects’ average probability estimate. (A) Results from URD models (URD-γ,URD-γ-λ). (B) Results from DN models (DN-1-γ,DN-2-γ) and RN model (RN). (C–D) Results from fitting the models implemented in the Rescorla–Wagner reinforcement-learning model framework. Models were fit at the individual-subject level. (C) Results from URD models (URD-γ,URD-γ-λ). (D) Results from DN models (DN-1-γ,DN-2-γ) and RN model (RN). (E) Model simulations on choice probability. Here, we show simulations from four of the models mentioned above. We plot choice probability based on simulated choice data according to the Rescorla–Wagner model parameter estimates from each subject. These results should be compared with subjects’ actual choice probability shown in Fig 3A. Conventions are the same as in Fig 3A. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. DN, divisive normalization; OS, the other stimulus present in the same context as the stimulus of interest; RN, range normalization; S, stimulus of interest; URD, uncertainty and reference dependent.
Fig 9
Fig 9. dACC, VMPFC, and rIPS represent context effect on probability estimates.
(A–C) dACC results. (A) In a between-subject, cross-validated MVPA, we found that patterns of multivoxel activity in dACC predicted context effect on individual subjects’ probability estimates (ΔP^50%) using activity patterns at the time of stimulus presentation (magenta) and at reward feedback (cyan; p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected for 1,350 voxels in the dACC ROI). The voxels shown are the ones that survived Bonferroni correction. (B) Actual ΔP^50% plotted against predicted ΔP^50% based on activity pattern—at the time of stimulus presentation—in the searchlight centered on the dACC voxel that produced the largest correlation between actual and predicted ΔP^50% (referred to as the peak voxel). (C) Actual ΔP^50% plotted against predicted ΔP^50% based on activity pattern—at the time of reward feedback—of the peak voxel in dACC. (D–E) VMPFC results. (D) VMPFC voxels that significantly predicted behavioral context effect (ΔP^50%) at the time of reward feedback (p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected for 1,776 voxels in the VMPFC ROI). The voxels shown are the ones that survived Bonferroni correction. (E) Scatter plot using data from the peak VMPFC voxel. Conventions are the same as in panels B and C. (F) rIPS results (p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected for 196 voxels in the rIPS ROI). Scatter plot using data from the peak rIPS voxel. The dashed line in panels B, C, E, and F represents the 45-degree line, indicating perfect prediction. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; MVPA, multivoxel pattern analysis; rIPS, right intraparietal sulcus; ROI, region of interest; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Fig 10
Fig 10. Univariate GLM results replicating reward magnitude and reward prediction error representations in VMPFC and VS and showing significant reward-frequency representation in VS.
(A) Neural correlates of reward magnitude at the time of reward feedback. Cluster-level inference using Gaussian random field theory was performed (familywise error corrected at p < 0.05) with a p < 0.001 cluster-forming threshold. (B) ROI analysis on reward prediction error. We used VMPFC and VS ROIs from two meta-analysis papers on value-based decision making ([26]: shown as Bartra and colleagues; [27] shown as C&R) and VS ROI identified through LOSO method based on reward prediction error contrast at the time of reward feedback. (C) ROI analysis on frequency of reward associated with stimulus (fS) and the overall reward frequency associated with a context (foverall). *p < 0.05. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. GLM, general linear model; LOSO, leave one subject out; ROI, region of interest; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; VS, ventral striatum.
Fig 11
Fig 11. Experiment 3: Examining context effects on probability estimates at 10%, 30%, and 50% reward and finding further support for the URD model.
Conventions are the same as in Fig 5. The design principle of the experiment was identical to the design in Fig 1B except that subjects faced 10%, 30%, and 50% reward probabilities instead of 10%, 50%, and 90% reward. (A) Probability estimates of 10% reward. (B) Probability estimates of 30% reward. (C) Probability estimates of 50% reward. (D) Choice probability in the lottery decision task after the probability estimation task. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. URD, uncertainty and reference dependent.
Fig 12
Fig 12. Experiment 4: Examining context effects on probability estimates at 50%, 70%, and 90% reward and finding further support for the URD model.
Conventions are the same as in Fig 5. The design principle of the experiment was identical to the design of Experiments 1 and 2 (Fig 1B) except that subjects faced 50%, 70%, and 90% reward probabilities instead of 10%, 50%, and 90% reward. (A) Probability estimates of 50% reward. (B) Probability estimates of 70% reward. (C) Probability estimates of 90% reward. (D) Choice probability in the lottery decision task after the probability estimation task. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. The red star symbol indicates a significant difference from 0.5 based on 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. URD, uncertainty and reference dependent.
Fig 13
Fig 13. Experiment 5: Examining context effects on probability estimates at 30%, 50%, and 70% reward and finding further support for the URD model.
Conventions are the same as in Fig 5. The design principle of the experiment was identical to the design of Experiments 1 and 2 (Fig 1B) except that subjects faced 30%, 50%, and 70% reward probabilities instead of 10%, 50%, and 90% reward. (A) Probability estimates of 30% reward. (B) Probability estimates of 50% reward. (C) Probability estimates of 70% reward. (D) Choice probability in the lottery decision task after the probability estimation task. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m. URD, uncertainty and reference dependent.
Fig 14
Fig 14. Experiment 6: Using an incentive-compatible design to examine context effects on probability estimates at 10%, 50%, and 90% reward and replicating the context effects seen in Experiments 1 and 2.
Conventions are the same as in Fig 5. The design principle of the experiment was identical to the design of Experiments 1 and 2 (Fig 1B) except that we provided monetary incentives to the subjects to give accurate probability estimates. (A) Probability estimates of 10% reward. (B) Probability estimates of 50% reward. (C). Probability estimates of 90% reward. (D) Choice probability in the lottery decision task after the probability estimation task. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. The red star symbol indicates a significant difference from 0.5 based on 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Data underlying these graphs can be found in https://osf.io/48j7m.

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