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. 2020 May 11;192(19):E497-E505.
doi: 10.1503/cmaj.200476. Epub 2020 Apr 8.

Mathematical modelling of COVID-19 transmission and mitigation strategies in the population of Ontario, Canada

Affiliations

Mathematical modelling of COVID-19 transmission and mitigation strategies in the population of Ontario, Canada

Ashleigh R Tuite et al. CMAJ. .

Abstract

Background: Physical-distancing interventions are being used in Canada to slow the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, but it is not clear how effective they will be. We evaluated how different nonpharmaceutical interventions could be used to control the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and reduce the burden on the health care system.

Methods: We used an age-structured compartmental model of COVID-19 transmission in the population of Ontario, Canada. We compared a base case with limited testing, isolation and quarantine to scenarios with the following: enhanced case finding, restrictive physical-distancing measures, or a combination of enhanced case finding and less restrictive physical distancing. Interventions were either implemented for fixed durations or dynamically cycled on and off, based on projected occupancy of intensive care unit (ICU) beds. We present medians and credible intervals from 100 replicates per scenario using a 2-year time horizon.

Results: We estimated that 56% (95% credible interval 42%-63%) of the Ontario population would be infected over the course of the epidemic in the base case. At the epidemic peak, we projected 107 000 (95% credible interval 60 760-149 000) cases in hospital (non-ICU) and 55 500 (95% credible interval 32 700-75 200) cases in ICU. For fixed-duration scenarios, all interventions were projected to delay and reduce the height of the epidemic peak relative to the base case, with restrictive physical distancing estimated to have the greatest effect. Longer duration interventions were more effective. Dynamic interventions were projected to reduce the proportion of the population infected at the end of the 2-year period and could reduce the median number of cases in ICU below current estimates of Ontario's ICU capacity.

Interpretation: Without substantial physical distancing or a combination of moderate physical distancing with enhanced case finding, we project that ICU resources would be overwhelmed. Dynamic physical distancing could maintain health-system capacity and also allow periodic psychological and economic respite for populations.

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Conflict of interest statement

Competing interests: Amy Greer receives funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and the Canada Research Chairs Program. No other competing interests were declared.

Figures

Figure 1:
Figure 1:
Model structure of COVID-19 transmission. Exposed cases can be either quarantined or not; quarantined cases would represent those who were identified via contact tracing. Cases admitted to hospital are assumed to be no longer infectious to others (owing to recognition of infection) and are included in the model to estimate health care requirements. The model is stratified by age group and presence or absence of comorbidities. Note: ICU = intensive care unit.
Figure 2:
Figure 2:
Projected COVID-19 epidemic trajectory for the base case model with minimal intervention. Daily incident cases per 1000 population are presented. The line represents the median value of 100 model simulations, and the shaded area indicates the 95% credible interval.
Figure 3:
Figure 3:
Projected intensive care unit (ICU) bed requirements and attack rates for fixed-duration interventions. (A) Prevalent cases requiring intensive care are shown for intervention durations of 1, 3, 6, 12 and 18 months. Maximum and current ICU capacity in Ontario are indicated by the dashed horizontal lines. Median values are presented. (B) Model-projected percentage of the population infected over the 2-year period. Attack rates include all infections, regardless of severity. Note that the slight variability in epidemic size for the base case (with no additional intervention) reflects model stochasticity across simulations. More extreme durations of physical distancing create the possibility of stochastic extinction (“die out”) of the disease.
Figure 4:
Figure 4:
Projected intensive care unit (ICU) bed requirements and attack rates for dynamic interventions. (A) Prevalent cases requiring intensive care are shown for the base case and 3 intervention scenarios. Interventions are turned on and off (returning to base-case parameter values), depending on the number of COVID-19 cases in the ICU. Maximum and current ICU capacity in Ontario are indicated by the dashed horizontal lines. Median values are presented. (B) Zoomed view of prevalent ICU cases to show the dynamics for the enhanced physical-distancing and combination scenarios. (C) Model-projected estimates of percent of the population infected over the 2-year period. Attack rates include all incident infections, regardless of severity. The amount of time the dynamic interventions are in place is shown on the x-axis. Points indicate the median duration and lines the 95% credible intervals for each scenario.

Comment in

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