Moving On Our Feet: For a Nomadic Psychology
- PMID: 32279199
- DOI: 10.1007/s12124-020-09529-0
Moving On Our Feet: For a Nomadic Psychology
Abstract
Zagaria, Andò and Zennaro have provided a useful analysis of the theoretical precariousness of psychology by looking at a number of its core concepts. They propose that evolutionary psychology could be a unifying approach for the otherwise fragmented discipline. In this response, I argue that although evolutionary psychology provides many interesting perspectives on the mental life of human beings, it is much too soon to jump to a unifying conclusion for psychology on its basis. Before beginning the work of explaining the functioning of the mind in evolutionary terms, we need illuminating descriptions of mental life as such. Phenomenological description should precede evolutionary explanation, and the former will reveal that mental life is intentional and normative - something that evolutionary and other explanatory perspectives have difficulties accommodating. When the subject matter is human mental life, it might be better to live with conceptual confusion than obtaining consensus on a misguided foundation. I agree with the authors that psychology stands on feet of clay, but instead of lamenting the "unsteady building" of the discipline, I suggest we embrace a more nomadic life for psychology - moving about on our feet - given the fact that humans perpetually and historically seem to reflect on their own lives, which is a process that should be kept open rather than terminated.
Keywords: Evolutionary psychology; Foundations; Intentionality; Normativity; Phenomenology; Psychologization.
Comment on
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Psychology: a Giant with Feet of Clay.Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2020 Sep;54(3):521-562. doi: 10.1007/s12124-020-09524-5. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2020. PMID: 32297037
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