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. 2020 Jul;16(7):e9723.
doi: 10.15252/msb.20209723.

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

Benjamin D Trump  1 , S E Galaitsi  1 , Evan Appleton  2 , Diederik A Bleijs  3 , Marie-Valentine Florin  4 , Jimmy D Gollihar  5 , R Alexander Hamilton  6 , Todd Kuiken  7 , Filippa Lentzos  8 , Ruth Mampuys  9 , Myriam Merad  10 , Tatyana Novossiolova  11 , Kenneth Oye  4   12 , Edward Perkins  1 , Natàlia Garcia-Reyero  1 , Catherine Rhodes  13 , Igor Linkov  1
Affiliations

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

Benjamin D Trump et al. Mol Syst Biol. 2020 Jul.

Abstract

The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Increasing number of global users able to access genetic engineering (blue) and synthetic biology (orange) technologies over time.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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