Urgency, leakage, and the relative nature of information processing in decision-making

Abstract

Over the last decade, there has been a robust debate in decision neuroscience and psychology about what mechanism governs the time course of decision-making. Historically, the most prominent hypothesis is that neural architectures accumulate information over time until some threshold is met, the so-called Evidence Accumulation hypothesis. However, most applications of this theory rely on simplifying assumptions, belying a number of potential complexities. Is changing stimulus information perceived and processed in an independent manner or is there a relative component? Does urgency play a role? What about evidence leakage? Although the latter questions have been the subject of recent investigations, most studies to date have been piecemeal in nature, addressing one aspect of the decision process or another. Here we develop a modeling framework, an extension of the Urgency Gating Model, in conjunction with a changing information experimental paradigm to simultaneously probe these aspects of the decision process. Using state-of-the-art Bayesian methods to perform parameter-based inference, we find that (a) information processing is relative with early information influencing the perception of late information, (b) time varying urgency and evidence accumulation are of roughly equal strength in the decision process, and (c) leakage is present with a time scale of ∼200-250 ms. We also show that these effects can only be identified in a changing information paradigm. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study to utilize a changing information paradigm to jointly and quantitatively estimate the temporal dynamics of human decision-making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).