The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution

Gregory Lewis^{1

2}, Jacob L Jordan³, David A Relman^{4

5}, Gregory D Koblentz⁶, Jade Leung⁷, Allan Dafoe⁷, Cassidy Nelson⁷, Gerald L Epstein⁸, Rebecca Katz⁹, Michael Montague¹⁰, Ethan C Alley^{11

12

13}, Claire Marie Filone¹⁴, Stephen Luby⁴, George M Church^{11

13}, Piers Millett^{7

15}, Kevin M Esvelt^{11

12}, Elizabeth E Cameron³, Thomas V Inglesby¹⁰

Affiliations

¹ Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
² Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
³ Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, USA.
⁴ Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.
⁵ Department of Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine; and Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.
⁶ Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Washington, DC, USA.
⁷ Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
⁸ Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA.
⁹ Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.
¹⁰ Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
¹¹ Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.
¹² Media Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
¹³ Department of Genetics, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA.
¹⁴ The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MA, USA.
¹⁵ International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition, Boston, MA, USA.

PMID: 33293537
PMCID: PMC7722838
DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-19149-2

Review

The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution

Gregory Lewis et al. Nat Commun. 2020.

. 2020 Dec 8;11(1):6294.

doi: 10.1038/s41467-020-19149-2.

Authors

Affiliations

¹ Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
² Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA. gregory.lewis@zoo.ox.ac.uk.
³ Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, USA.
⁴ Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA, USA.
⁵ Department of Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine; and Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.
⁶ Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Washington, DC, USA.
⁷ Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
⁸ Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA.
⁹ Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.
¹⁰ Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
¹¹ Alt. Technology Labs, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA.
¹² Media Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
¹³ Department of Genetics, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA.
¹⁴ The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MA, USA.
¹⁵ International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition, Boston, MA, USA.

PMID: 33293537
PMCID: PMC7722838
DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-19149-2

Abstract

Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology.

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Conflict of interest statement

G.L, E.C.A., G.M.C., P.M., K.M.E., and T.V.L. are involved in a genetic engineering attribution challenge hosted by drivendata (https://www.drivendata.org/competitions/63/genetic-engineering-attribution/). A full list of G.M.C.’s tech transfer, advisory roles, and funding sources can be found on the lab’s website http://arep.med.harvard.edu/gmc/tech.html. All other authors declare no competing interests.

References

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The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution

Affiliations

The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution

Authors

Affiliations

Abstract

Conflict of interest statement

References

Publication types

MeSH terms

Substances

LinkOut - more resources

Full Text Sources

Medical

Miscellaneous