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. 2021 Mar;43(2):2-18.
doi: 10.1002/eahr.500083. Epub 2021 Feb 23.

The Ethics of Repurposing Previously Collected Research Biospecimens in an Infectious Disease Pandemic

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The Ethics of Repurposing Previously Collected Research Biospecimens in an Infectious Disease Pandemic

Benjamin E Berkman et al. Ethics Hum Res. 2021 Mar.

Abstract

In the early days of a pandemic, repurposing biospecimens from established research projects could prove to be extraordinarily useful in achieving substantial and timely public health benefits. Nonetheless, there are potential ethical and regulatory uncertainties that may impede access to those valuable biospecimens. In this article, we argue that there should be a presumption in favor of using previously collected identifiable research biospecimens without reconsent to directly address an infectious disease pandemic, assuming certain conditions are met. This argument fills a unique yet critical gap in decision-making where the specific consent accompanying the identifiable biospecimens would not otherwise permit repurposing. Further, it suggests that even if gaining reconsent is feasible, doing so in a fast-moving crisis is not necessary. This analysis also attempts to address the ethical concerns of public health authorities who already may have the power to use such specimens but are reluctant to do so.

Keywords: biospecimen research; human research ethics; human subjects research; identifiable research biospecimens; infectious disease pandemic; informed consent; pandemic.

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    1. We will focus on research biospecimens throughout this article, but our argument is similarly applicable to research data.