Tree-Huggers Versus Human-Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Abstract

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade-offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree-huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human-lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero-sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree-huggers and human-lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree-huggers and human-lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one-third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree-huggers and human-lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree-huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members-thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Keywords: Anthropomorphism; Dehumanization; Mind attribution; Moral circles; Moral worth; Zero-sum bias.