The physical basis of conceptual representation - An addendum to

Abstract

Gallistel (2020) argues that current research on the physical basis of memory assumes an associationistic approach and thus fails to provide an account of quantitative facts because quantitative facts cannot be sensed and have no qualia. But are these approaches any better suited for investigating how we store concepts of concrete things such as dogs, tables and sand, which clearly have qualia? Seven examples of the abstract quantitative and non-quantitative formal structure found in the conceptual representation of concrete things are used to show that Gallistel's critique clearly extends to the conceptual representations stored in semantic memory. Gallistel (2020) presents compelling arguments that the physical basis for quantitative facts will not be the synapse or cell assemblies, but the information-bearing molecules inside the neuron. Given that quantitative facts are intrinsic to even our simplest conceptual representations, we should expect the same for conceptual representations.

Keywords: Conceptual representation; Formal structure; Object concepts.