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. 2021 Jun;3(6):e360-e370.
doi: 10.1016/S2589-7500(21)00077-7.

Changes in the incidence of invasive disease due to Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis during the COVID-19 pandemic in 26 countries and territories in the Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance Initiative: a prospective analysis of surveillance data

Angela B Brueggemann  1 Melissa J Jansen van Rensburg  2 David Shaw  2 Noel D McCarthy  3 Keith A Jolley  4 Martin C J Maiden  4 Mark P G van der Linden  5 Zahin Amin-Chowdhury  6 Désirée E Bennett  7 Ray Borrow  8 Maria-Cristina C Brandileone  9 Karen Broughton  10 Ruth Campbell  11 Bin Cao  12 Carlo Casanova  13 Eun Hwa Choi  14 Yiu Wai Chu  15 Stephen A Clark  8 Heike Claus  16 Juliana Coelho  10 Mary Corcoran  17 Simon Cottrell  18 Robert J Cunney  17 Tine Dalby  19 Heather Davies  20 Linda de Gouveia  21 Ala-Eddine Deghmane  22 Walter Demczuk  23 Stefanie Desmet  24 Richard J Drew  17 Mignon du Plessis  21 Helga Erlendsdottir  25 Norman K Fry  6 Kurt Fuursted  19 Steve J Gray  8 Birgitta Henriques-Normark  26 Thomas Hale  27 Markus Hilty  13 Steen Hoffmann  19 Hilary Humphreys  7 Margaret Ip  28 Susanne Jacobsson  29 Jillian Johnston  11 Jana Kozakova  30 Karl G Kristinsson  25 Pavla Krizova  31 Alicja Kuch  32 Shamez N Ladhani  6 Thiên-Trí Lâm  16 Vera Lebedova  33 Laura Lindholm  34 David J Litt  10 Irene Martin  23 Delphine Martiny  35 Wesley Mattheus  36 Martha McElligott  7 Mary Meehan  7 Susan Meiring  37 Paula Mölling  29 Eva Morfeldt  38 Julie Morgan  39 Robert M Mulhall  7 Carmen Muñoz-Almagro  40 David R Murdoch  41 Joy Murphy  11 Martin Musilek  31 Alexandre Mzabi  42 Amaresh Perez-Argüello  40 Monique Perrin  42 Malorie Perry  18 Alba Redin  40 Richard Roberts  18 Maria Roberts  18 Assaf Rokney  43 Merav Ron  43 Kevin J Scott  44 Carmen L Sheppard  10 Lotta Siira  34 Anna Skoczyńska  32 Monica Sloan  11 Hans-Christian Slotved  19 Andrew J Smith  44 Joon Young Song  45 Muhamed-Kheir Taha  22 Maija Toropainen  34 Dominic Tsang  15 Anni Vainio  34 Nina M van Sorge  46 Emmanuelle Varon  47 Jiri Vlach  33 Ulrich Vogel  16 Sandra Vohrnova  30 Anne von Gottberg  21 Rosemeire C Zanella  9 Fei Zhou  12
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Changes in the incidence of invasive disease due to Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis during the COVID-19 pandemic in 26 countries and territories in the Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance Initiative: a prospective analysis of surveillance data

Angela B Brueggemann et al. Lancet Digit Health. 2021 Jun.

Erratum in

  • Correction to Lancet Digit Health 2021; 3: e360-70.
    [No authors listed] [No authors listed] Lancet Digit Health. 2021 Jul;3(7):e413. doi: 10.1016/S2589-7500(21)00103-5. Epub 2021 May 26. Lancet Digit Health. 2021. PMID: 34052209 Free PMC article. No abstract available.

Abstract

Background: Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis, which are typically transmitted via respiratory droplets, are leading causes of invasive diseases, including bacteraemic pneumonia and meningitis, and of secondary infections subsequent to post-viral respiratory disease. The aim of this study was to investigate the incidence of invasive disease due to these pathogens during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Methods: In this prospective analysis of surveillance data, laboratories in 26 countries and territories across six continents submitted data on cases of invasive disease due to S pneumoniae, H influenzae, and N meningitidis from Jan 1, 2018, to May, 31, 2020, as part of the Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance (IRIS) Initiative. Numbers of weekly cases in 2020 were compared with corresponding data for 2018 and 2019. Data for invasive disease due to Streptococcus agalactiae, a non-respiratory pathogen, were collected from nine laboratories for comparison. The stringency of COVID-19 containment measures was quantified using the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. Changes in population movements were assessed using Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports. Interrupted time-series modelling quantified changes in the incidence of invasive disease due to S pneumoniae, H influenzae, and N meningitidis in 2020 relative to when containment measures were imposed.

Findings: 27 laboratories from 26 countries and territories submitted data to the IRIS Initiative for S pneumoniae (62 837 total cases), 24 laboratories from 24 countries submitted data for H influenzae (7796 total cases), and 21 laboratories from 21 countries submitted data for N meningitidis (5877 total cases). All countries and territories had experienced a significant and sustained reduction in invasive diseases due to S pneumoniae, H influenzae, and N meningitidis in early 2020 (Jan 1 to May 31, 2020), coinciding with the introduction of COVID-19 containment measures in each country. By contrast, no significant changes in the incidence of invasive S agalactiae infections were observed. Similar trends were observed across most countries and territories despite differing stringency in COVID-19 control policies. The incidence of reported S pneumoniae infections decreased by 68% at 4 weeks (incidence rate ratio 0·32 [95% CI 0·27-0·37]) and 82% at 8 weeks (0·18 [0·14-0·23]) following the week in which significant changes in population movements were recorded.

Interpretation: The introduction of COVID-19 containment policies and public information campaigns likely reduced transmission of S pneumoniae, H influenzae, and N meningitidis, leading to a significant reduction in life-threatening invasive diseases in many countries worldwide.

Funding: Wellcome Trust (UK), Robert Koch Institute (Germany), Federal Ministry of Health (Germany), Pfizer, Merck, Health Protection Surveillance Centre (Ireland), SpID-Net project (Ireland), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (European Union), Horizon 2020 (European Commission), Ministry of Health (Poland), National Programme of Antibiotic Protection (Poland), Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Poland), Agencia de Salut Pública de Catalunya (Spain), Sant Joan de Deu Foundation (Spain), Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation (Sweden), Swedish Research Council (Sweden), Region Stockholm (Sweden), Federal Office of Public Health of Switzerland (Switzerland), and French Public Health Agency (France).

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Conflict of interest statement

Declaration of interests The following authors received support for work unrelated to this study: MPGvdL has received grants from Pfizer, Merck, and the Robert Koch Institut; RB has done contract research on behalf of Public Health England for GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Sanofi Pasteur, but received no personal remuneration; MC has received grants from Pfizer; SAC has done contract research on behalf of Public Health England for GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Sanofi Pasteur, but received no personal remuneration; SD has received a grant from Pfizer; SJG did contract research (carriage studies) for vaccine manufacturers (GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer) on behalf of Public Health England, but received no personal remuneration; MH has received grants from Pfizer and the Federal Office of Public Health, and personal fees (for being on an advisory board) from Pfizer and Merck Sharp & Dohme; HH has received grants from Astellas and Pfizer; KAJ has received a grant from Wellcome Trust and personal fees from GlaxoSmithKline; SNL has done contract research for vaccine manufacturers (GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Sanofi Pasteur) on behalf of St. George's University of London, but received no personal remuneration; DJL has received grants from GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer; SM has received a grant from Sanofi Pasteur; CM-A has received grants from Quiastat, Roche, Pfizer, and Genomica, and personal fees from Roche, Pfizer, and Qiagen; LS has received a grant from GlaxoSmithKline; H-CS has received a grant from Pfizer; MI has received non-financial support from GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer, personal fees from Pfizer (speaker fees) and Merck Sharp & Dohme (speaker fees), and grants from Merck Sharp & Dohme; M-KT has received grants from GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Sanofi Pasteur; ASk has received grants and non-financial support from Pfizer, and personal fees from Pfizer, Merck Sharp & Dohme, and Sanofi Pasteur; CLS has received grants from Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline for investigator-led research; EV has received grants on behalf of her institution (Intercommunal Hospital of Créteil) from Pfizer and Merck Sharp & Dohme; MT has received grants from GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer; NKF's institution (Public Health England) has received funding for investigator-initiated research from GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and other vaccine manufacturers (GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Affinivax), but NKF received no personal remuneration; AvG has received a grant from Sanofi Pasteur; NMvS has received a grant from Pfizer, a fee for service paid to their institution from Merck Sharp & Dohme and GlaxoSmithKline, and also has a patent (WO 2013/020090 A3) on vaccine development against Streptococcus pyogenes, unrelated to this study, with royalties paid to University of California San Diego, CA, USA; and MKT has a patent (630133) for a vaccine for serogroup X meningococcus with GlaxoSmithKline. All other authors declare no competing interests.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Cumulative number of invasive disease cases collected by Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance laboratories each week from Jan 1, 2018, to May 31, 2020 Data for Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis were obtained from Belgium, Brazil, Canada (S pneumoniae only), China (S pneumoniae and H influenzae only), Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel (S pneumoniae and H influenzae only), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Poland, Scotland, South Africa, South Korea (S pneumoniae and H influenzae only), Spain (S pneumoniae and N meningitidis only), Sweden, Switzerland (S pneumoniae and H influenzae only), and Wales. Data for Streptococcus agalactiae were obtained from Denmark, England, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, and Poland. The grey dotted line (on week 11) shows when WHO officially declared the COVID-19 pandemic. ISO=International Organization for Standardization.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Annual invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae cases submitted to Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance laboratories in 26 countries and territories from Jan 1, 2018, to May 31, 2020 Coloured bars represent the mean weekly Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) stringency index values on a scale from 0 to 100, with larger (darker) values indicating that higher stringency measures were enacted within a country. Data for South Korea were submitted from two surveillance networks, one of which started invasive disease surveillance in September, 2018, so data presented here for that hospital are only from September, 2018, onwards, whereas the data from the other hospital are from January, 2018, onwards. ISO=International Organization for Standardization.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Estimated country-specific incidence rate ratios for invasive disease due to Streptococcus pneumoniae following interruptions in population mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic Estimated country-specific incidence rate ratios calculated using an interrupted time series model that allows for a step (A) or slope (B) reduction in invasive disease. Estimated country-specific incidence rate ratios after 4 weeks (C) or 8 weeks (D) from the point at which national mobility was significantly interrupted (appendix p 4).

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