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. 2021 Sep 17:6:121.
doi: 10.12688/wellcomeopenres.16661.2. eCollection 2021.

Tracking the international spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351/501Y-V2 with grinch

Áine O'Toole #  1 Verity Hill #  1 Oliver G Pybus  2 Alexander Watts  3   4 Issac I Bogoch  5   6 Kamran Khan  3   4   5 Jane P Messina  7 COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) consortiumNetwork for Genomic Surveillance in South Africa (NGS-SA)Brazil-UK CADDE Genomic NetworkHouriiyah Tegally  8 Richard R Lessells  8 Jennifer Giandhari  8 Sureshnee Pillay  8 Kefentse Arnold Tumedi  9 Gape Nyepetsi  10 Malebogo Kebabonye  11 Maitshwarelo Matsheka  9 Madisa Mine  10 Sima Tokajian  12 Hamad Hassan  13 Tamara Salloum  12 Georgi Merhi  12 Jad Koweyes  12 Jemma L Geoghegan  14   15 Joep de Ligt  15 Xiaoyun Ren  15 Matthew Storey  15 Nikki E Freed  16 Chitra Pattabiraman  17 Pramada Prasad  17 Anita S Desai  17 Ravi Vasanthapuram  17 Thomas F Schulz  18 Lars Steinbrück  18 Tanja Stadler  19 Swiss Viollier Sequencing ConsortiumAntonio Parisi  20 Angelica Bianco  20 Darío García de Viedma  21   22 Sergio Buenestado-Serrano  21 Vítor Borges  23 Joana Isidro  23 Sílvia Duarte  24 João Paulo Gomes  23 Neta S Zuckerman  25 Michal Mandelboim  25 Orna Mor  25 Torsten Seemann  26 Alicia Arnott  27 Jenny Draper  27 Mailie Gall  27 William Rawlinson  28 Ira Deveson  29 Sanmarié Schlebusch  30 Jamie McMahon  30 Lex Leong  31 Chuan Kok Lim  31 Maria Chironna  32 Daniela Loconsole  32 Antonin Bal  33 Laurence Josset  33 Edward Holmes  34 Kirsten St George  35 Erica Lasek-Nesselquist  35 Reina S Sikkema  36 Bas Oude Munnink  36 Marion Koopmans  36 Mia Brytting  37 V Sudha Rani  38 S Pavani  38 Teemu Smura  39 Albert Heim  18 Satu Kurkela  40 Massab Umair  41 Muhammad Salman  41 Barbara Bartolini  42 Martina Rueca  42 Christian Drosten  43 Thorsten Wolff  44 Olin Silander  16 Dirk Eggink  45 Chantal Reusken  45 Harry Vennema  45 Aekyung Park  46 Christine Carrington  47 Nikita Sahadeo  47 Michael Carr  48 Gabo Gonzalez  48 SEARCH Alliance San DiegoNational Virus Reference LaboratorySeqCOVID-SpainDanish Covid-19 Genome Consortium (DCGC)Communicable Diseases Genomic Network (CDGN)Dutch National SARS-CoV-2 surveillance programDivision of Emerging Infectious Diseases (KDCA)Tulio de Oliveira  8 Nuno Faria  2   49 Andrew Rambaut  1 Moritz U G Kraemer  2
Affiliations

Tracking the international spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351/501Y-V2 with grinch

Áine O'Toole et al. Wellcome Open Res. .

Abstract

Late in 2020, two genetically-distinct clusters of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with mutations of biological concern were reported, one in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa. Using a combination of data from routine surveillance, genomic sequencing and international travel we track the international dispersal of lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 (variant 501Y-V2). We account for potential biases in genomic surveillance efforts by including passenger volumes from location of where the lineage was first reported, London and South Africa respectively. Using the software tool grinch (global report investigating novel coronavirus haplotypes), we track the international spread of lineages of concern with automated daily reports, Further, we have built a custom tracking website (cov-lineages.org/global_report.html) which hosts this daily report and will continue to include novel SARS-CoV-2 lineages of concern as they are detected.

Keywords: B.1.1.7; B.1.351; N501Y; SARS-CoV-2; air travel; coronavirus; genome sequencing; genomic epidemiology; genomic surveillance; genomics; pandemic; sequencing; surveillance; virus.

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Conflict of interest statement

No competing interests were disclosed.

Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.
a) The cumulative number of countries with reports of lineage B.1.1.7 (grey line) and cumulative number of genomes of B.1.1.7 deposited in GISAID. b) Rolling seven-day average of the proportion of B.1.1.7 genomes in countries with more than ten sequences of the variant, and with more than ten days between the first B.1.1.7 sequence and the most recent one compared to all sampled genomes in that country. c) Number of sequences (log10) per country. Colour indicates the proportion of sequences that are classified as lineage B.1.1.7. d) Number of air travellers from major international London airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, Luton, City, Stansted, Southend) during October 2020. Colour indicates the number of sampled genomes of lineage B.1.1.7. Reported refers to countries that we found media reports stating there had been sequences of that particular lineage, but for which there were no sequences on GISAID. This is distinct from ‘not reported’ where there were no records found of that lineage in a given country. e) Map of international flights from major international London airports to countries with B.1.1.7 sequences. Colours indicate the date of earliest detection of B.1.1.7. in each country. The width of the lines indicates the number of flights. International Air Transport Association data used here account for ~90% of passenger travel itineraries on commercial flights, excluding transportation via unscheduled charter flights (the remainder is modelled using market intelligence). Data shown represents origin-destination journeys during October 2020. Routes to countries that have not yet detected B.1.1.7 and deposited data on GISAID are not included.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.
a) Shows the cumulative number of countries with reports of lineage B.1.351 (black line) and cumulative number of genomes of B.1.351 deposited in GISAID. b) Rolling seven-day average of the proportion of B.1.351 genomes in countries with more than ten sequences of the variant, and with more than ten days between the first B.1.351 sequence and the most recent one compared to all sampled genomes in that country. c) Number of sequences (log10) per country. Colour indicates the proportion of sequences that are classified as lineage B.1.351 d) Number of air travellers from South Africa during October 2020. Colour indicates the number of sampled genomes of lineage B.1.351. Not reported refers to a given country having no record of B.1.351, and reported refers to countries that we found media reports but that country had no SARS-CoV-2 genomes shared on GISAID at that time. e) Map of international flights to countries with B.1.351 sequences. Colours indicate the date of earliest detection of B.1.351 in each country. The width of the lines indicates the number of flights. International Air Transport Association data used here account for ~90% of passenger travel itineraries on commercial flights, excluding transportation via unscheduled charter flights (the remainder is modelled using market intelligence). Data shown represents origin-destination journeys during October 2020. Routes to countries that have not yet detected B.1.351 and deposited data on GISAID are not included. >300 travellers from South Africa).

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