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. 2021 Jun 15;12(1):3643.
doi: 10.1038/s41467-021-23733-5.

Insights into household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from a population-based serological survey

Collaborators, Affiliations

Insights into household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from a population-based serological survey

Qifang Bi et al. Nat Commun. .

Abstract

Understanding the risk of infection from household- and community-exposures and the transmissibility of asymptomatic infections is critical to SARS-CoV-2 control. Limited previous evidence is based primarily on virologic testing, which disproportionately misses mild and asymptomatic infections. Serologic measures are more likely to capture all previously infected individuals. We apply household transmission models to data from a cross-sectional, household-based population serosurvey of 4,534 people ≥5 years from 2,267 households enrolled April-June 2020 in Geneva, Switzerland. We found that the risk of infection from exposure to a single infected household member aged ≥5 years (17.3%,13.7-21.7) was more than three-times that of extra-household exposures over the first pandemic wave (5.1%,4.5-5.8). Young children had a lower risk of infection from household members. Working-age adults had the highest extra-household infection risk. Seropositive asymptomatic household members had 69.4% lower odds (95%CrI,31.8-88.8%) of infecting another household member compared to those reporting symptoms, accounting for 14.5% (95%CrI, 7.2-22.7%) of all household infections.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no competing interests.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1. Epidemic curve and recruitment period of household serosurvey.
a daily confirmed COVID-19 cases reported in Geneva up to July 1st, 2020. b Daily number of recruited households over the 12-week study period. First detected case in Geneva canton was reported on February 26th, and the first epidemic wave lasted about two months. Yellow bands indicate time periods of study enrollment for each week. This includes all 4438 households enrolled in the SEROCoV-POP study, not restricted to the complete households used in these analyses for which serostatus of all household members were available.
Fig. 2
Fig. 2. Risk of extra-household transmission and within-household transmission from a single infected household member.
a Estimated median probability of extra-household infection from the start of the epidemic in Geneva until the time of the serosurvey by age group and sex. b Estimated median probability of infection from a single infected household member by age group and sex. Dots and bars represent median and 95% credible intervals of the posterior distribution. Probabilities of being infected by sex and age group of the exposed individuals are estimated by a model only including age and sex of the exposed individuals (model 2, orange/green bars; see Table S2). Probabilities of being infected by the age group of the exposed individuals combining males and females (left four gray bars on both panels) are estimated with an age-only model (model 1). The overall probabilities of being infected (rightmost gray bar on both panels) are estimated with the null model (model 0).
Fig. 3
Fig. 3. Risk factors of SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission.
Relative odds of being infected outside the household and from a single infected household member by individual characteristics of the exposed individuals, a age group, b sex, and c potential infectors’ symptom status. Odds ratios and credible intervals, shown on the log-scale, are estimates from model 4 (see Table S2).

References

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