Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status
- PMID: 34406731
- Bookshelf ID: NBK572928
Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status
Excerpt
When a being or entity has moral status its interests matter morally, for its own sake (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018). If a being or entity has moral status, then an act that is morally bad, in at least one respect, is committed when an agent harms that being or entity. Any all-things-considered moral justification for such an act must take into account the harm committed by the agent against that being or entity. Ordinary adult humans are usually supposed to have a specific and equal level of moral status – often referred to as ‘full moral status’ (FMS). Non-human animals are usually accorded some moral status, but this is typically understood to be a lesser level or degree of moral status than FMS.
© Stephen Clarke and Julian Savulescu 2021.
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References
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