From Bounded Rationality to Collective Behavior

Abstract

Since the pioneering work of Herbert A. Simon, bounded rationality (BR) constitutes a viable alternative to utility maximization in settings characterized by uncertainty about the possible emergence of novel events, missing information, and limitations to human reasoning. Because of its realism, BR gained consensus in organization and management studies. However, BR is a theory of individual decision-making. Substantial extensions are required in order to turn it into a tool to analyze collective decision processes. Following an intuition by the late Simon himself, we submit that organizations channel information flows in ways that alleviate human BR. Thus, analysis and reconstruction of their structure as well as differential degrees and qualities of individual BR within organizations is key to extend this concept to collective decision-making. In this special issue we collected contributions where instances of BR couple with interaction structures to yield collective behavior. Tools range from mathematical models to experimental settings to computational models, testifying to the value of multiple approaches and perspectives.