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. 2021 Nov 22;376(1838):20200288.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0288. Epub 2021 Oct 4.

Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?

H Clark Barrett  1 , Rebecca R Saxe  2
Affiliations

Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?

H Clark Barrett et al. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. .

Abstract

Cross-cultural research on moral reasoning has brought to the fore the question of whether moral judgements always turn on inferences about the mental states of others. Formal legal systems for assigning blame and punishment typically make fine-grained distinctions about mental states, as illustrated by the concept of mens rea, and experimental studies in the USA and elsewhere suggest everyday moral judgements also make use of such distinctions. On the other hand, anthropologists have suggested that some societies have a morality that is disregarding of mental states, and have marshalled ethnographic and experimental evidence in support of this claim. Here, we argue against the claim that some societies are simply less 'mind-minded' than others about morality. In place of this cultural main effects hypothesis about the role of mindreading in morality, we propose a contextual variability view in which the role of mental states in moral judgement depends on the context and the reasons for judgement. On this view, which mental states are or are not relevant for a judgement is context-specific, and what appear to be cultural main effects are better explained by culture-by-context interactions. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Keywords: cooperation; cultural main effects; mental opacity; morality; strict liability; theory of mind.

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