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. 2022 Jan 27;17(1):e0262430.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0262430. eCollection 2022.

A value-based model of job performance

Affiliations

A value-based model of job performance

Michael Roos et al. PLoS One. .

Erratum in

Abstract

This agent-based model contributes to a theory of corporate culture in which company performance and employees' behaviour result from the interaction between financial incentives, motivational factors and endogenous social norms. Employees' personal values are the main drivers of behaviour. They shape agents' decisions about how much of their working time to devote to individual tasks, cooperative, and shirking activities. The model incorporates two aspects of the management style, analysed both in isolation and combination: (i) monitoring efforts affecting intrinsic motivation, i.e. the company is either trusting or controlling, and (ii) remuneration schemes affecting extrinsic motivation, i.e. individual or group rewards. The simulations show that financial incentives can (i) lead to inefficient levels of cooperation, and (ii) reinforce value-driven behaviours, amplified by emergent social norms. The company achieves the highest output with a flat wage and a trusting management. Employees that value self-direction highly are pivotal, since they are strongly (de-)motivated by the management style.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Figures

Fig 1
Fig 1. Model overview.
The numbers in parenthesis are equation numbers.
Fig 2
Fig 2. Density function of the triangular distribution for a generic social norm.
Fig 3
Fig 3. Circular motivational continuum source: Adapted from Schwartz et al. [21].
Fig 4
Fig 4. Deviation from norms.
Fig 5
Fig 5. Density functions for cooperativeness.
Fig 6
Fig 6. Deviations from shirking norm in different organisational cultures.
Fig 7
Fig 7. Cooperative vs. competitive reward scheme.
Fig 8
Fig 8. Aggregate realised output per scenario.
Fig 9
Fig 9. Aggregate average time—Absolute baseline.
Fig 10
Fig 10. Realised output, average individual, cooperation and shirking time per value-types—Absolute baseline.
Fig 11
Fig 11. Effect of lower variability on O-agents’ behaviour.
Fig 12
Fig 12. Aggregate average time—No incentives.
Fig 13
Fig 13. Realised output, average individual, cooperation and shirking time per value-types—No incentives.
Fig 14
Fig 14. Aggregate average time—No monitoring.
Fig 15
Fig 15. Realised output, average individual, cooperation and shirking time per value-types—No monitoring.
Fig 16
Fig 16. Aggregate average time—PFP schemes and monitoring strategies.

References

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