Why Intellectual Disability is Not Mere Difference

Abstract

A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall-any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes's Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad-by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (2) universally bad-it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad-it reduces a person's overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior-lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference.

Keywords: Bad difference; Elizabeth Barnes; Intellectual disability; Mere difference; Quality of life; Well-being.