Science, Dualities and the Phenomenological Map
- PMID: 35694551
- PMCID: PMC9172098
- DOI: 10.1007/s10699-022-09850-4
Science, Dualities and the Phenomenological Map
Abstract
We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the phenomenological map, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper's concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding "abduction" in the literature and its relation with "analogy".
Keywords: Abduction; Bild; Epistemological shift; Pragmaticism.
© The Author(s) 2022.
Conflict of interest statement
Conflict of interestNot applicable.
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