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. 2023 Jun;76(6):1275-1297.
doi: 10.1177/17470218221111750. Epub 2022 Jul 15.

Combining refutations and social norms increases belief change

Affiliations

Combining refutations and social norms increases belief change

Ullrich Kh Ecker et al. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove). 2023 Jun.

Abstract

Misinformed beliefs are difficult to change. Refutations that target false claims typically reduce false beliefs, but tend to be only partially effective. In this study, a social norming approach was explored to test whether provision of peer norms could provide an alternative or complementary approach to refutation. Three experiments investigated whether a descriptive norm-by itself or in combination with a refutation-could reduce the endorsement of worldview-congruent claims. Experiment 1 found that using a single-point estimate to communicate a norm affected belief but had less impact than a refutation. Experiment 2 used a verbally presented distribution of four values to communicate a norm, which was largely ineffective. Experiment 3 used a graphically presented social norm with 25 values, which was found to be as effective at reducing claim belief as a refutation, with the combination of both interventions being most impactful. These results provide a proof of concept that normative information can aid in the debunking of false or equivocal claims, and suggests that theories of misinformation processing should take social factors into account.

Keywords: Misinformation; belief change; continued influence effect; debunking; false beliefs; social norms.

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Conflict of interest statement

Declaration of conflicting interests

The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1. Mean Claim-Belief Ratings Across Time-Points in Experiment 1
Note. Belief change from time-point 1 to time-point 2 reflects the impact of a descriptive pre-refutation norm (collapsed across confidentiality conditions). Belief change from time-point 2 to time-point 3 reflects the impact of a refutation (collapsed across post-refutation norm and confidentiality conditions). Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show individual raw data points (jittered).
Figure 2
Figure 2. Mean Belief-Change Scores Across Conditions in Experiment 2
Note. Claim beliefs were measured on 0-10 scales. Norm information was only provided in narrow and wide norm conditions, either by itself (Experiment 2A) or together with the refutation (Experiment 2B). The two refutation conditions were identical. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show individual raw data points (jittered).
Figure 3
Figure 3. Mean Predictive Estimate Scores Across Conditions in Experiment 2
Note. Predictive estimate scores of 1 indicate full claim endorsement; scores of 0 reflect fully-effective intervention; scores < 0 indicate hypercorrection; scores > 1 reflect increased belief. Norm information was only provided in narrow and wide norm conditions, either by itself (Experiment 2A) or together with the refutation (Experiment 2B). The two refutation conditions were identical. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show raw data points (jittered).
Figure 4
Figure 4. Mean Inference Scores Across Conditions in Experiment 2
Note. Greater inference scores indicate greater claim endorsement. Norm information was only provided in narrow and wide norm conditions, either by itself (Experiment 2A) or together with the refutation (Experiment 2B). The two refutation conditions were identical. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show individual raw data points (jittered).
Figure 5
Figure 5. Graphical Norm Representations in Experiment 3
Note. Illustration of narrow (top panel) and wide (bottom panel) claim-endorsement (left panel) and predictive-estimate (right panel) norm distributions; each circle ostensibly represents one individual peer rating.
Figure 6
Figure 6. Mean Belief-Change Scores Across Conditions in Experiment 3
Note. Claim beliefs were measured on 0-100 scales. Norm information was only provided in narrow and wide norm conditions, either by itself (Experiment 3A) or together with the refutation (Experiment 3B). The two refutation conditions were identical. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show individual raw data points (jittered; “95” labels a data point not shown in its actual y-axis position).
Figure 7
Figure 7. Mean Predictive Estimate Scores Across Conditions in Experiment 3
Note. Predictive estimate scores of 1 indicate full claim endorsement; scores of 0 reflect fully-effective intervention; scores < 0 indicate hypercorrection. Norm information was only provided in narrow and wide norm conditions, either by itself (Experiment 3A) or together with the refutation (Experiment 3B). The two refutation conditions were identical. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show individual raw data points (jittered).
Figure 8
Figure 8. Mean Inference Scores Across Conditions in Experiment 3
Note. Greater inference scores indicate greater claim endorsement. Norm information was only provided in narrow and wide norm conditions, either by itself (Experiment 3A) or together with the refutation (Experiment 3B). The two refutation conditions were identical. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Dots show individual raw data points (jittered).

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