Rebuttal to Douglas and Elliott
- PMID: 35782721
- PMCID: PMC9239931
- DOI: 10.1007/s10838-022-09616-3
Rebuttal to Douglas and Elliott
Abstract
In "Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis", I argue that the problem of bias in science, a key factor in the current reproducibility crisis, is worsened if we follow Heather Douglas and Kevin C. Elliott's advice and introduce non-epistemic values into the evidential assessment of scientific hypotheses. In their response to my paper, Douglas and Elliott complain that I misrepresent their views and fall victim to various confusions. In this rebuttal I argue, by means of an examination of their published views, that my initial interpretation of their work is accurate and that, in their hands, science is generally prone to deviations from truth.
© The Author(s) 2022.
References
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- Bluhm, R. 2017. Inductive Risk and the Role of Values in Clinical Trials. In K. Elliott and T. Richards (Eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science (pp. 193–212). New York: Oxford University Press.
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- Douglas, H. 2008. The role of values in expert reasoning. Public Affairs Quarterly, 22, 1–18.
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- Douglas H. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: University of; 2009.
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- Douglas, H. 2017. Why Inductive Risk Requires Values in Science. In K. Elliott and D. Steel (Eds.), Current Controversies in Values and Science (pp. 81–93). New York: Routledge.
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- Elliott, K. 2011a. Is a Little Pollution Good for You? Incorporating Societal Values in Environmental Research. New York: Oxford University Press.
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