Skip to main page content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Dot gov

The .gov means it’s official.
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

Https

The site is secure.
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Access keys NCBI Homepage MyNCBI Homepage Main Content Main Navigation
. 2022 Aug 9;13(1):4380.
doi: 10.1038/s41467-022-31860-w.

A strategy to assess spillover risk of bat SARS-related coronaviruses in Southeast Asia

Affiliations

A strategy to assess spillover risk of bat SARS-related coronaviruses in Southeast Asia

Cecilia A Sánchez et al. Nat Commun. .

Abstract

Emerging diseases caused by coronaviruses of likely bat origin (e.g., SARS, MERS, SADS, COVID-19) have disrupted global health and economies for two decades. Evidence suggests that some bat SARS-related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoVs) could infect people directly, and that their spillover is more frequent than previously recognized. Each zoonotic spillover of a novel virus represents an opportunity for evolutionary adaptation and further spread; therefore, quantifying the extent of this spillover may help target prevention programs. We derive current range distributions for known bat SARSr-CoV hosts and quantify their overlap with human populations. We then use probabilistic risk assessment and data on human-bat contact, human viral seroprevalence, and antibody duration to estimate that a median of 66,280 people (95% CI: 65,351-67,131) are infected with SARSr-CoVs annually in Southeast Asia. These data on the geography and scale of spillover can be used to target surveillance and prevention programs for potential future bat-CoV emergence.

PubMed Disclaimer

Conflict of interest statement

P.D. served as a member of the WHO-China joint study on COVID-19 origins, is a current member of the Taskforce on the Origins and Early Spread of COVID-19 and One Health Solutions to Future Pandemics, and was Chair of the IPBES Pandemics and Biodiversity Workshop. P.D. has made numerous public statements both independently, and as part of these groups, on the likely origins of COVID-19 and the need to assess risk and prioritize targeted surveillance for future disease emergence. L.F.W. serves on multiple committees for WHO, FAO, and OIE on COVID-19 including assay and vaccine development and animal models; has ongoing research investigating the origin of COVID-19; and has made statements on this issue to the media. P.Z. serves on multiple committees for MOST (China) on COVID-19 including pathogen identification, monitoring viral mutations, and the likely origin of COVID-19. Z.L.S. has made statements to the media about the likely origins of COVID-19. The remaining authors declare no competing interests.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1. Relationships among area of habitat (AOH) size, number of people, and habitat proportions.
a Scatterplot showing the total number of people living in each AOH versus the total area, for each SARSr-CoV bat host species. A best-fit line was fit through the origin, for which the R2 is displayed. The four unlabeled species at the bottom left corner are (left to right): R. hipposideros, N. leisleri, T. teniotis, and R. creaghi. b Proportion of each habitat type (by area) within species AOHs. c People living in the AOH of each species, separated by habitat type. For b and c, species are listed in order of increasing AOH size, and the species order is the same in both panels. Genus abbreviations in all panels: A. = Aselliscus, C. = Chaerephon, H. = Hipposideros, N. = Nyctalus, R. = Rhinolophus, T. = Tadarida.
Fig. 2
Fig. 2. Hotspots of SARSr-CoV bat host species richness and human overlap in Southeast Asia.
a Species richness of SARSr-CoV bat host species in Southeast Asia, created by overlaying area of habitat maps for all 26 SARSr-CoV bat host species known for this region. b Relative bat-human overlap: bat host species richness multiplied by human population count. Values were ln(x + 1) transformed and then normalized to a 0–1 scale. For both panels, redder colors indicate larger values and bluer colors indicate smaller values.
Fig. 3
Fig. 3. Spillover simulations and sensitivity analyses.
a Density plots of the estimated total number of people in Southeast Asia infected with SARSr-CoVs by bats each year. Line colors represent scenarios exploring how estimated spillover changes if one or both of two parameter distributions (Pcontact and Pdetect) are refit after excluding the highest estimates of these parameters gathered via literature searches (see Methods for details). Note that the x-axis is on a log10 scale. b Estimated total number of people in Southeast Asia infected with SARSr-CoVs by bats each year, plotted as a function of four input variables. Values correspond to the original scenario (i.e., no adjusted parameters). c Sobol sensitivity indices, indicating the amount of variance in the outcome due to each input on its own (first-order index) and the amount of variance in the outcome due to each input including interactions with other inputs (total-order index). Sobol indices were calculated with two random samples of 200,000 points each. Red dots represent calculated index values and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Values correspond to the original scenario (i.e., no adjusted parameters).
Fig. 4
Fig. 4. Key data inputs and future research needs to improve estimates of SARSr-CoVs spillover from bats to humans.
Additional data inputs are organized according to steps in our probabilistic risk assessment to improve our understanding of: a wildlife reservoir host (bat) distribution, b people overlapping with bat hosts, c probability of human-bat contact, d probability of detecting antibodies given contact, and e dynamics of antibody response in individuals.

Update of

Comment in

Similar articles

Cited by

References

    1. Lee J-W, McKibbin WJ. Globalization and disease: the case of SARS. Asian Economic Pap. 2004;3:113–131. doi: 10.1162/1535351041747932. - DOI
    1. Cutler DM, Summers LH. The COVID-19 pandemic and the $16 trillion virus. JAMA. 2020;324:1495–1496. doi: 10.1001/jama.2020.19759. - DOI - PMC - PubMed
    1. Peiris JSM, Guan Y, Yuen KY. Severe acute respiratory syndrome. Nat. Med. 2004;10:S88–S97. doi: 10.1038/nm1143. - DOI - PMC - PubMed
    1. Raj VS, Osterhaus ADME, Fouchier RAM, Haagmans BL. MERS: emergence of a novel human coronavirus. Curr. Opin. Virol. 2014;5:58–62. doi: 10.1016/j.coviro.2014.01.010. - DOI - PMC - PubMed
    1. Zhou P, et al. Fatal swine acute diarrhoea syndrome caused by an HKU2-related coronavirus of bat origin. Nature. 2018;556:255–258. doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0010-9. - DOI - PMC - PubMed

Publication types