A Bayesian perspective on severity: risky predictions and specific hypotheses
- PMID: 35969359
- PMCID: PMC10104935
- DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02069-1
A Bayesian perspective on severity: risky predictions and specific hypotheses
Abstract
A tradition that goes back to Sir Karl R. Popper assesses the value of a statistical test primarily by its severity: was there an honest and stringent attempt to prove the tested hypothesis wrong? For "error statisticians" such as Mayo (1996, 2018), and frequentists more generally, severity is a key virtue in hypothesis tests. Conversely, failure to incorporate severity into statistical inference, as allegedly happens in Bayesian inference, counts as a major methodological shortcoming. Our paper pursues a double goal: First, we argue that the error-statistical explication of severity has substantive drawbacks; specifically, the neglect of research context and the specificity of the predictions of the hypothesis. Second, we argue that severity matters for Bayesian inference via the value of specific, risky predictions: severity boosts the expected evidential value of a Bayesian hypothesis test. We illustrate severity-based reasoning in Bayesian statistics by means of a practical example and discuss its advantages and potential drawbacks.
Keywords: Bayes factors; Deborah Mayo; Error statistics; Karl Popper; Null hypothesis significance testing; Severity; Statistical test.
© 2022. The Author(s).
Conflict of interest statement
There are no conflicts of interest.
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