Believing is seeing: A Buddhist theory of creditions
- PMID: 35992400
- PMCID: PMC9384695
- DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.938731
Believing is seeing: A Buddhist theory of creditions
Abstract
The creditions model is incredibly powerful at explaining both how beliefs are formed and how they influence our perceptions. The model contains several cognitive loops, where beliefs not only influence conscious interpretations of perceptions downstream but are active in the subconscious construction of perceptions out of sensory information upstream. This paper shows how this model is mirrored in the epistemology of two central Buddhist figures, Dignāga (480-540 CE) and Dharmakı̄rti (c. 550-650 CE). In addition to showing these parallels, the paper also demonstrates that by drawing on Dignāga and Dharmakı̄rti's theory, we can extend the explanatory power of the creditions model. Namely, while creditions explain how beliefs influence both the conscious interpretation and subconscious construction of sensory information, Dignāga and Dharmakı̄rti suggest beliefs can even be generative of sensory-like information. I recruit ancient Buddhist texts in conjunction with contemporary cognitive science scholarship to offer a hypothesis for the cognitive mechanisms responsible for this.
Keywords: Buddhism; cognitive science; epistemology; meditation; perception.
Copyright © 2022 Forman.
Conflict of interest statement
The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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