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. 2022;200(5):351.
doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03846-0. Epub 2022 Aug 19.

The case for eliminativism about words

Nick Tasker  1
Affiliations

The case for eliminativism about words

Nick Tasker. Synthese. 2022.

Abstract

Words are ubiquitous and familiar, and the concept of a word features both in common-sense ways of understanding the world, and in more theoretical discourse. Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly argued that there is no such thing as words. In this paper, I will set out a range of arguments for eliminativism about words, and indicate the most promising responses. I begin by considering an eliminativist argument based on the alleged mind-dependency of words, before turning to two challenges arising from linguistic theory in the Chomskian tradition. The first of these is issued by Rey in a number of places, including in his recent book (Rey, 2020). The second is Collins's ( 2010, 2021a) argument based on the alleged explanatory redundancy of words. I will also consider an eliminativist challenge based on the difficulty of providing existence and persistence conditions for words. One general lesson which emerges is that these eliminativist arguments, if they work at all, could be turned against a whole swathe of non-linguistic objects; in other words, the case for eliminativism about words is no stronger than the case for eliminativism about ordinary objects in general.

Keywords: Eliminativism; Illusions; Mind-dependence; Ordinary objects; SLEs; Slurs; Words.

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Conflict of interest statement

Conflict of interestI confirm that there are no other persons who satisfied the criteria for authorship but are not listed. The research presented in this article was carried out by me partially while employed by Hertford College Oxford, and partly while a member of the Nature of Representation Research Group, based at the University of Leeds, and funded by the European Research Council. I certify that I have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. I confirm that there are no impediments to publication with respect to intellectual property.

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