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. 2022 Nov;100(11):550-561.
doi: 10.1111/avj.13195. Epub 2022 Sep 15.

FMD vaccine allocation and surveillance resourcing options for a potential Australian incursion

A H Seitzinger  1 , M G Garner  1 , R Bradhurst  2 , S Roche  3 , A C Breed  3   4 , T Capon  1 , C Miller  3 , S Tapsuwan  1
Affiliations

FMD vaccine allocation and surveillance resourcing options for a potential Australian incursion

A H Seitzinger et al. Aust Vet J. 2022 Nov.

Abstract

Australian Animal Disease Spread (AADIS) epidemiological simulation modelling of potential foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in the state of Victoria, Australia examined the targeted use of limited vaccine supplies in combination with varying surveillance resources. Updated, detailed estimates of government response costs were prepared based on state level data inputs of required and available resources. Measures of outbreak spread such as duration and numbers of animals removed through depopulation of infected and vaccinated herds from the epidemiological modelling were compared to summed government response costs. This comparison illustrated the trade-offs between targeted control strategies combining vaccination-to-remove and varying surveillance capacities and their corresponding costs. For this intensive cattle and sheep producing region: (1) Targeting vaccination toward intensive production areas or toward specialized cattle operations had outbreak control and response cost advantages similar to vaccination of all species. The median duration was reduced by 27% and response costs by 11%. (2) Adding to the pool of outbreak surveillance resources available further decreased outbreak duration and outbreak response costs. The median duration was reduced by an additional 13% and response costs declined by an additional 8%. (3) Pooling of vaccine resources overcame the very early binding constraints under proportional allocation of vaccines to individual states with similar reductions in outbreak duration to those with additional surveillance resources. However, government costs rose substantially by over 40% and introduced additional risk of a negative consumer response. Increased knowledge of the outbreak situation obtained from more surveillance led to better-informed vaccination deployment decisions in the short timeframe they needed to be made.

Keywords: AADIS; foot-and-mouth disease; model; surveillance; vaccination; vaccine allocation.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. This project is supported by Meat & Livestock Australia (MLA), through funding from the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water, and the Environment as part of its Rural R&D for Profit program, and by producer levies from Australian FMD‐susceptible livestock (cattle, sheep, goats and pigs) industries and Charles Sturt University (CSU), leveraging significant in‐kind support from the research partners. The research partners for this project are the Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), CSU through the Graham Centre for Agricultural Innovation, the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) and the Australian Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment, supported by Animal Health Australia (AHA).

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Distributions of AADIS outbreak results comparing stamping out alone with FMD vaccination options targeted by species, geographic areas, and ring size. The naming convention for each of the control strategies specifies: (A) vaccine strategy: no vaccination (SOI), vaccination of FMD susceptible species (SO3), high risk, livestock dense areas (SO4); feedlot, dairy, and intensive beef cattle, excluding mixed beef‐sheep farms (SO6). (B) Vaccine is limited to Victoria (VIC). (C) Vaccine dose allocation strategy: 100,000 dose maximum per state (100K); 500,000 dose national shared pool maximum (500K). AADIS, Australian Animal Disease Spread; FMD, foot‐and‐mouth disease.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Distributions of AADIS outbreak results in pooled vaccine doses and increased surveillance resources. The naming convention for each of the control strategies specifies: (A) vaccine strategy: no vaccination (SO1), vaccination of FMD susceptible species (SO3); high risk, livestock dense areas (SO4), feedlot, dairy, and intensive beef cattle, excluding mixed beef‐sheep farms (SO6). (B) Vaccine is limited to Victoria (VIC). (C) Vaccine dose allocation strategy: 100,000 dose maximum per state (100K), 500,000 dose national shared pool maximum (500K). (D) Additional surveillance resources (1.5xsurv). AADIS, Australian Animal Disease Spread; FMD, foot‐and‐mouth disease
Figure 3
Figure 3
(A, B) Surveillance visit deficits for first 100 outbreak days of 500 iterations of AADIS under stamping out alone (SO1) and current surveillance resource estimate versus 50% increase in surveillance resources (1.5xsurv). Surveillance visit deficit: number of surveillance visits which could not be completed for each day of simulated outbreak. AADIS, Australian Animal Disease Spread.
Figure 4
Figure 4
(A, B) Surveillance visit deficits for first 100 outbreak days of 500 iterations of AADIS under vaccination to remove all susceptible species (SO3) and current surveillance resource estimate versus 50% increase in surveillance resources (1.5xsurv). Surveillance visit deficit: number of surveillance visits which could not be completed for each day of simulated outbreak. AADIS, Australian Animal Disease Spread.
Figure 5
Figure 5
Distributions of AADIS total response costs with pooled vaccine doses and increased response costs. AADIS, Australian Animal Disease Spread.
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