Skip to main page content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Dot gov

The .gov means it’s official.
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

Https

The site is secure.
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Access keys NCBI Homepage MyNCBI Homepage Main Content Main Navigation
Review

Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats

In: Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology: Addressing Security and Resilience Issues [Internet]. Dordrecht (DE): Springer; 2021. Chapter 12.
.
Affiliations
Free Books & Documents
Review

Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats

Cassidy Nelson et al.
Free Books & Documents

Excerpt

Rapid developments in the fields of synthetic biology and biotechnology have caused shifts in the biological risk landscape and are key drivers of future threats. From a security perspective, extending our understanding beyond current risks to include emerging threats in these and related fields can play a vital role in informing risk mitigation activities. Insights that are generated can be combined with other efforts to identify vulnerabilities and prevent undesirable outcomes. Emerging risks that may occur at some point in the future are inherently difficult to assess, requiring a systematic approach to examining potential threats. Foresight is a process to consider possible future scenarios. Comprising a range of methods and techniques, foresight processes can offer novel insights into emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology threats.

This chapter offers an introduction to foresight, including definitions of key terms that could support a shared lexicon across NATO partners. An overview of different foresight methodologies, their potential applications, and different strengths and limitations are presented. As a key first step, an approach to selecting appropriate questions to guide foresight activities is suggested. Example questions for synthetic biology and biotechnology are highlighted. At the end of the chapter, the authors offer recommendations for the design of a foresight process, with the intention of providing a useable resource for NATO partners investigating emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology threats.

PubMed Disclaimer

References

    1. Boddie C, Watson M, Ackerman G, Gronvall GK (2015) Assessing the bioweapons threat. Science 349(6250):792–793 - PubMed
    1. Cuhls K, Blind K, Grupp H (2012) Innovations for our future: Delphi’98: new foresight on science and technology, vol 13. Springer
    1. Fischhoff B (1975) Hindsight is not equal to foresight: the effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 1(3):288
    1. Frow E, Calvert J (2013) Opening up the future (s) of synthetic biology. Futures 48:32–43 - PMC - PubMed
    1. Government Office for Science (2017) Futures toolkit for policy-makers and analysts. UK Government: 1.0. 2017 Nov. Available: [Internet]. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploa...

LinkOut - more resources