Towards characterizing the canonical computations generating phenomenal experience

Abstract

Science and philosophy have long struggled with how to even begin studying the neural or computational basis of qualitative experience. Here I review psychological, neuroscience, and philosophical literature to reveal how perceptual metacognition possesses five unique properties that provide a powerful opportunity for studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience: (1) Metacognition leads to subjective experiences (we "feel" confident); (2) Metacognition is "about" internal representations, formalizing introspection; (3) Metacognitive computations are "recursive" (applying to meta-cognition and meta-meta-cognition), so we might discover "canonical computations" preserved across processing levels and implementations; (4) Metacognition is anchored to observable behavior; and (5) Metacognitive computations are unobservable yet hierarchically dependent, requiring development of sensitive, specific models. Given these properties, computational models of metacognition provide an empirically-tractable early step in characterizing the generative process that constructs qualitative experience. I also present practical ways to make progress in this vein, applying decades of developments in nearby fields to perceptual metacognition to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs subjective conscious experiences.

Keywords: Computational modeling; Consciousness; Metacognition; Phenomenology; Qualia.