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Review
. 2022 Sep 27;14(10):2126.
doi: 10.3390/v14102126.

Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic and How Blood Operators Can Prepare for the Next Pandemic

Affiliations
Review

Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic and How Blood Operators Can Prepare for the Next Pandemic

Steven J Drews et al. Viruses. .

Abstract

Humans interact with virus-infected animal hosts, travel globally, and maintain social networks that allow for novel viruses to emerge and develop pandemic potential. There are key lessons-learned from the coronavirus diseases 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic that blood operators can apply to the next pandemic. Warning signals to the COVID-19 pandemic included outbreaks of Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus-1 (SARS-CoV-1) and Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the prior two decades. It will be critical to quickly determine whether there is a risk of blood-borne transmission of a new pandemic virus. Prior to the next pandemic blood operators should be prepared for changes in activities, policies, and procedures at all levels of the organization. Blood operators can utilize "Plan-Do-Study-Act" cycles spanning from: vigilance for emerging viruses, surveillance activities and studies, operational continuity, donor engagement and trust, and laboratory testing if required. Occupational health and donor safety issues will be key areas of focus even if the next pandemic virus is not transfusion transmitted. Blood operators may also be requested to engage in new activities such as the development of therapeutics or supporting public health surveillance activities. Activities such as scenario development, tabletop exercises, and drills will allow blood operators to prepare for the unknowns of the next pandemic.

Keywords: blood operators; blood-borne agents; emerging viral pathogens; pandemic planning.

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Conflict of interest statement

Steven J Drews has functioned as a content expert for respiratory viruses for Johnson & Johnson (Janssen) and has received funding in-kind from Abbott. He has also acted as a paid consultant to Roche on Arboviruses and Malaria.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Four steps in a pandemic planning MFI. Pandemic planning is not a static process and required clear aims with well-designed proposed changes in practice. Effective pandemic planning also requires an understanding of how to measure implemented changes. PDSA cycles allow for incremental tests of change.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Activities that support pandemic preparedness. To ensure the safe supply of blood products, blood operators undertake complex activities on a routine basis. Pathogen-specific areas of focus (black text) include vigilance for emerging viruses, surveillance, donor studies and risk assessments for viruses that have emerged and initiating laboratory testing for emerging viruses. Core activities to ensure the adequate supply of blood products (red text) include donor engagement and trust, and maintenance of operations. Individuals working in blood operator settings may be engaged in one or more of these activity areas. Resources allotted to areas of focus may depend on a variety of factors including whether the emerging pathogen is transfusion-transmitted, or the level of disease spread in a donor population or work force.

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