The pox of politics: Troesken's tradeoff reexamined
- PMID: 36311040
- PMCID: PMC9589814
- DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01002-3
The pox of politics: Troesken's tradeoff reexamined
Abstract
In The Pox of Liberty, Werner Troesken details the tradeoff between liberal institutions and communicable disease. According to Troesken, individual freedom presents a danger to the public health in the face of infectious disease, while constitutional constraints restrict the government's ability to implement effective policy. Contra Troesken, I argue that decision-makers, amidst a crisis of contagion, neglect intertemporal tradeoffs, thereby discounting long run costs while favoring short run policies. These policies, once implemented, are difficult to reverse due to the path dependent nature of political institutions. Irreversible and self-reinforcing growth in political institutions established to enhance health can have an unintended negative impact on health during future crises, where political agents must operate in a more cumbersome and error-prone institutional environment. Using events from the history of public health in the U.S. as support for my theory, I conclude that Troesken's alleged tradeoff ought to be met with greater skepticism.
Keywords: Bureaucracy; COVID-19; Crisis; Disease; Government failure; Government growth; Interest groups; Pandemics; Path dependence; Public health; Rent seeking.
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022, Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
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