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. 2022 Nov 1;5(11):e2239661.
doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.39661.

COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing in New York City, June 1, 2020, to October 31, 2021

Kathleen Blaney  1 , Steffen Foerster  1 , Jennifer Baumgartner  1 , Megan Benckert  2 , Janice Blake  1 , Jackie Bray  2   3 , Shadi Chamany  1 , Katelynn Devinney  1 , Annie Fine  1   4 , Masha Gindler  2 , Laura Guerra  2 , Amanda Johnson  2 , Chris Keeley  2 , David Lee  1 , Mia Lipsit  2 , Sarah McKenney  1 , Kavita Misra  1 , Sarah Perl  1 , Dana Peters  1 , Madhury Ray  1 , Eduardo Saad  1 , Guajira Thomas  1 , Lisa Trieu  1 , Chi-Chi Udeagu  1 , Julian Watkins  1 , Marcia Wong  1 , Lindsay Zielinski  1 , Theodore Long  2 , Neil M Vora  1
Affiliations

COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing in New York City, June 1, 2020, to October 31, 2021

Kathleen Blaney et al. JAMA Netw Open. .

Abstract

Importance: Contact tracing is a core strategy for preventing the spread of many infectious diseases of public health concern. Better understanding of the outcomes of contact tracing for COVID-19 as well as the operational opportunities and challenges in establishing a program for a jurisdiction as large as New York City (NYC) is important for the evaluation of this strategy.

Objective: To describe the establishment, scaling, and maintenance of Trace, NYC's contact tracing program, and share data on outcomes during its first 17 months.

Design, setting, and participants: This cross-sectional study included people with laboratory test-confirmed and probable COVID-19 and their contacts in NYC between June 1, 2020, and October 31, 2021. Trace launched on June 1, 2020, and had a workforce of 4147 contact tracers, with the majority of the workforce performing their jobs completely remotely. Data were analyzed in March 2022.

Main outcomes and measures: Number and proportion of persons with COVID-19 and contacts on whom investigations were attempted and completed; timeliness of interviews relative to symptom onset or exposure for symptomatic cases and contacts, respectively.

Results: Case investigations were attempted for 941 035 persons. Of those, 840 922 (89.4%) were reached and 711 353 (75.6%) completed an intake interview (women and girls, 358 775 [50.4%]; 60 178 [8.5%] Asian, 110 636 [15.6%] Black, 210 489 [28.3%] Hispanic or Latino, 157 349 [22.1%] White). Interviews were attempted for 1 218 650 contacts. Of those, 904 927 (74.3%) were reached, and 590 333 (48.4%) completed intake (women and girls, 219 261 [37.2%]; 47 403 [8.0%] Asian, 98 916 [16.8%] Black, 177 600 [30.1%] Hispanic or Latino, 116 559 [19.7%] White). Completion rates were consistent over time and resistant to changes related to vaccination as well as isolation and quarantine guidance. Among symptomatic cases, median time from symptom onset to intake completion was 4.7 days; a median 1.4 contacts were identified per case. Median time from contacts' last date of exposure to intake completion was 2.3 days. Among contacts, 30.1% were tested within 14 days of notification. Among cases, 27.8% were known to Trace as contacts. The overall expense for Trace from May 6, 2020, through October 31, 2021, was approximately $600 million.

Conclusions and relevance: Despite the complexity of developing a contact tracing program in a diverse city with a population of over 8 million people, in this case study we were able to identify 1.4 contacts per case and offer resources to safely isolate and quarantine to over 1 million cases and contacts in this study period.

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Conflict of interest statement

Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Dr Fine reported receiving grants from the US Centers for Disease Control in a cooperative agreement during the conduct of the study. Dr Watkins reported grants from Robert Wood Johnson Foundation outside the submitted work. No other disclosures were reported.

Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.. COVID-19 Cases Investigated in New York City Between June 1, 2020, and October 31, 2021
aLaboratory confirmed and probable cases and symptomatic contacts
Figure 2.
Figure 2.. COVID-19 Contacts Identified in New York City Between June 1, 2020, and October 31, 2021a
aIndividuals within 6 feet of a person with COVID-19 while infectious for over 10 cumulative minutes.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.. COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Intake Timeliness Metrics in New York City Between June 1, 2020, and October 31, 2021
See this image and copyright information in PMC

References

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