Free Will as a Paradox: Empirical Evaluation of the Construct of Everyday Consciousness
- PMID: 36810992
- PMCID: PMC9939038
- DOI: 10.11621/pir2021.0109
Free Will as a Paradox: Empirical Evaluation of the Construct of Everyday Consciousness
Abstract
Background: Free will belongs to the category of phenomena that are actively discussed in scientific discourse but are neither verified nor proven false. Free will is studied in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology. We discuss this pluralism, multiplicity of perceptions, and the parties' arguments in the theoretical part of this article. We approach the existing polemics from the point of view of a person who is in the moment of making a decision and taking responsibility for it. The usual paradoxes are mitigated if we consider free will through the concepts underlying everyday consciousness.
Objective: Our aim is to introduce into the discussion of free will an understanding of its nature as a construct of everyday consciousness, one which acts as a factor in increasing the personal maturity of vital decisions. We also discuss the arguments of the various meta-positions in the dispute about free will.
Design: Our empirical research was designed as a modification of the experiments on imposed attitudes. The sample consisted of 340 people ages 30-50 years.
Results: The level of maturity of actions by the subjects who received the set for determinism was lower than that of the subjects who received the set for free will (U 5133; p = 0.014).
Conclusion: Our study showed that the stronger a person's belief in free will, the more personally mature that person's choices - actions - are; and that the more active that belief in free will, the more effective are their efforts to overcome social pressure.
Keywords: belief in free will; decision making; deed (action); free will; free will as illusion.; neuroscience; personality.
© Lomonosov Moscow State University, 2021© Russian Psychological Society, 2021.
Conflict of interest statement
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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References
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