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. 2023 Apr 20:11:1169073.
doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1169073. eCollection 2023.

Monitoring of indoor bioaerosol for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 in different hospital settings

Emma Tedeschini  1 , Stefania Pasqualini  2 , Carla Emiliani  2 , Ettore Marini  3 , Alessandro Valecchi  3 , Chiara Laoreti  3 , Stefano Ministrini  3   4 , Barbara Camilloni  3 , Roberto Castronari  3 , Lucio Patoia  5 , Francesco Merante  5 , Stefano Baglioni  6 , Edoardo De Robertis  2 , Matteo Pirro  2 , Antonella Mencacci  2 , Leonella Pasqualini  2
Affiliations

Monitoring of indoor bioaerosol for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 in different hospital settings

Emma Tedeschini et al. Front Public Health. .

Abstract

Background: Spore Trap is an environmental detection technology, already used in the field of allergology to monitor the presence and composition of potentially inspirable airborne micronic bioparticulate. This device is potentially suitable for environmental monitoring of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in hospital, as well as in other high-risk closed environments. The aim of the present study is to investigate the accuracy of the Spore Trap system in detecting SARS-CoV-2 in indoor bioaerosol of hospital rooms.

Methods: The Spore Trap was placed in hospital rooms hosting patients with documented SARS-CoV-2 infection (n = 36) or, as a negative control, in rooms where patients with documented negativity to a Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction molecular test for SARS-CoV-2 were admitted (n = 10). The monitoring of the bioaerosol was carried on for 24 h. Collected samples were analyzed by real-time polymerase chain reaction.

Results: The estimated sensitivity of the Spore Trap device for detecting SARS-CoV-2 in an indoor environment is 69.4% (95% C.I. 54.3-84.4%), with a specificity of 100%.

Conclusion: The Spore Trap technology is effective in detecting airborne SARS-CoV-2 virus with excellent specificity and high sensitivity, when compared to previous reports. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic scenario has suggested that indoor air quality control will be a priority in future public health management and will certainly need to include an environmental bio-investigation protocol.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; aerobiology; bioaerosol; environmental monitoring; environmental prevention.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Flow-chart of the study design.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Performance of the SporeTrap device in detecting the presence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in contaminated (SARS-CoV-2 +) and non-contaminated (SARS-CoV-2 -) hospital rooms.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Possible factors influencing the detection of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) by the SporeTrap technology. (A) Double rooms vs. single rooms. (B) Presence and modality of respiratory support. (C) Site of detection. NIV, non-invasive ventilation; SGB, “San Giovanni Battista” Hospital; UH, University Hospital.
Figure 4
Figure 4
Different viral load reported in patients admitted to the University Hospital (UH) or to the “San Giovanni Battista” Hospital (SGB).
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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