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. 2023 Sep;5(9):e582-e593.
doi: 10.1016/S2589-7500(23)00108-5. Epub 2023 Jul 27.

Trends in invasive bacterial diseases during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic: analyses of prospective surveillance data from 30 countries and territories in the IRIS Consortium

David Shaw  1 Raquel Abad  2 Zahin Amin-Chowdhury  3 Adriana Bautista  4 Desiree Bennett  5 Karen Broughton  6 Bin Cao  7 Carlo Casanova  8 Eun Hwa Choi  9 Yiu-Wai Chu  10 Heike Claus  11 Juliana Coelho  6 Mary Corcoran  12 Simon Cottrell  13 Robert Cunney  12 Lize Cuypers  14 Tine Dalby  15 Heather Davies  16 Linda de Gouveia  17 Ala-Eddine Deghmane  18 Walter Demczuk  19 Stefanie Desmet  14 Mirian Domenech  20 Richard Drew  21 Mignon du Plessis  17 Carolina Duarte  4 Helga Erlendsdóttir  22 Norman K Fry  23 Kurt Fuursted  24 Thomas Hale  25 Desiree Henares  26 Birgitta Henriques-Normark  27 Markus Hilty  8 Steen Hoffmann  24 Hilary Humphreys  28 Margaret Ip  29 Susanne Jacobsson  30 Christopher Johnson  13 Jillian Johnston  31 Keith A Jolley  32 Aníbal Kawabata  33 Jana Kozakova  34 Karl G Kristinsson  22 Pavla Krizova  35 Alicja Kuch  36 Shamez Ladhani  3 Thiên-Trí Lâm  11 María Eugenia León  33 Laura Lindholm  37 David Litt  38 Martin C J Maiden  32 Irene Martin  19 Delphine Martiny  39 Wesley Mattheus  40 Noel D McCarthy  41 Mary Meehan  5 Susan Meiring  42 Paula Mölling  30 Eva Morfeldt  43 Julie Morgan  44 Robert Mulhall  5 Carmen Muñoz-Almagro  45 David Murdoch  46 Joy Murphy  31 Martin Musilek  35 Alexandre Mzabi  47 Ludmila Novakova  48 Shahin Oftadeh  49 Amaresh Perez-Argüello  50 Maria Pérez-Vázquez  51 Monique Perrin  52 Malorie Perry  13 Benoit Prevost  53 Maria Roberts  13 Assaf Rokney  54 Merav Ron  54 Olga Marina Sanabria  4 Kevin J Scott  55 Carmen Sheppard  38 Lotta Siira  37 Vitali Sintchenko  56 Anna Skoczyńska  36 Monica Sloan  31 Hans-Christian Slotved  24 Andrew J Smith  57 Anneke Steens  58 Muhamed-Kheir Taha  18 Maija Toropainen  37 Georgina Tzanakaki  59 Anni Vainio  37 Mark P G van der Linden  60 Nina M van Sorge  61 Emmanuelle Varon  62 Sandra Vohrnova  34 Anne von Gottberg  17 Jose Yuste  20 Rosemeire Zanella  63 Fei Zhou  7 Angela B Brueggemann  64
Affiliations

Trends in invasive bacterial diseases during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic: analyses of prospective surveillance data from 30 countries and territories in the IRIS Consortium

David Shaw et al. Lancet Digit Health. 2023 Sep.

Abstract

Background: The Invasive Respiratory Infection Surveillance (IRIS) Consortium was established to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on invasive diseases caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, Neisseria meningitidis, and Streptococcus agalactiae. We aimed to analyse the incidence and distribution of these diseases during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the 2 years preceding the pandemic.

Methods: For this prospective analysis, laboratories in 30 countries and territories representing five continents submitted surveillance data from Jan 1, 2018, to Jan 2, 2022, to private projects within databases in PubMLST. The impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the overall number of cases was analysed, and changes in disease distributions by patient age and serotype or group were examined. Interrupted time-series analyses were done to quantify the impact of pandemic response measures and their relaxation on disease rates, and autoregressive integrated moving average models were used to estimate effect sizes and forecast counterfactual trends by hemisphere.

Findings: Overall, 116 841 cases were analysed: 76 481 in 2018-19, before the pandemic, and 40 360 in 2020-21, during the pandemic. During the pandemic there was a significant reduction in the risk of disease caused by S pneumoniae (risk ratio 0·47; 95% CI 0·40-0·55), H influenzae (0·51; 0·40-0·66) and N meningitidis (0·26; 0·21-0·31), while no significant changes were observed for S agalactiae (1·02; 0·75-1·40), which is not transmitted via the respiratory route. No major changes in the distribution of cases were observed when stratified by patient age or serotype or group. An estimated 36 289 (95% prediction interval 17 145-55 434) cases of invasive bacterial disease were averted during the first 2 years of the pandemic among IRIS-participating countries and territories.

Interpretation: COVID-19 containment measures were associated with a sustained decrease in the incidence of invasive disease caused by S pneumoniae, H influenzae, and N meningitidis during the first 2 years of the pandemic, but cases began to increase in some countries towards the end of 2021 as pandemic restrictions were lifted. These IRIS data provide a better understanding of microbial transmission, will inform vaccine development and implementation, and can contribute to health-care service planning and provision of policies.

Funding: Wellcome Trust, NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Torsten Söderberg Foundation, Stockholm County Council, Swedish Research Council, German Federal Ministry of Health, Robert Koch Institute, Pfizer, Merck, and the Greek National Public Health Organization.

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Conflict of interest statement

Declaration of interests The UK Health Security Agency's Immunisation and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Division has provided vaccine manufacturers (GSK, Pfizer, and Sanofi) with post-marketing surveillance reports, which the Marketing Authorization Holders are required to submit to the UK Licensing authority in compliance with their Risk Management Strategy. A cost recovery charge is made for these reports. The UK Health Security Agency's Respiratory and Vaccine Preventable Bacteria Reference Unit has received unrestricted research grants from Pfizer to participate in pneumococcal surveillance projects. CHI de Créteil (France) received research grants from the French Public Health Agency, Pfizer, and MSD. University Hospitals Leuven (Belgium) received research grants from Merck-MSD and Pfizer, and consulting fees from Merck-MSD. SD received personal payments or honoraria from Pfizer. The Swiss National Reference Center for Invasive Pneumococci received funding from the Federal Office of Public Health. MH has received grants from Pfizer and personal fees (for being on an advisory board) from Pfizer and Merck Sharp & Dohme. The National Medicines Institute (Warsaw, Poland) received funding from the Polish Ministry of Health, the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Pfizer, and MSD. AS received payments from MSD and Pfizer for lectures, and from MSD, Pfizer, and Sanofi Pasteur for participation in advisory boards. AS is the unpaid Vice President of the European Meningococcal and Haemophilus Disease Society. The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (Finland) received research funding from Pfizer. ABB is an unpaid adviser to WHO, providing expertise related to vaccines and antimicrobial resistance. ABB is an unpaid General Assembly member (2022 onwards), and has been a board member (2016–22) and Secretary (2018–22), of the International Society of Pneumonia and Pneumococcal Diseases (ISPPD). MD has received financial support from Pfizer to attend national scientific meetings. MdP received grant funding from the National Research Foundation (South Africa) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to support the International Pathogenic Neisseria Conference (IPNC) 2022 meeting. MdP received personal support from the ISPPD to participate in the ISPPD conference in 2022, and was a member of the organising and scientific committee for the IPNC meeting in 2022. HH and MC received a grant from Pfizer (W1243730) to investigate Irish pneumococcal serotypes by whole-genome sequencing. HH received payment from Scottish Hospitals Enquiry for expert testimony. HH was the President of the Healthcare Infection Society (2018–22). KAJ received personal royalties from GlaxoSmithKline, and personal honoraria from the Wellcome Trust. SL performs contract research on behalf of St George's University of London for pharmaceutical companies (GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Sanofi), including vaccine manufacturers, but does not receive any personal remuneration. T-TL received consulting fees from the Trond Mohn Foundation. T-TL is an unpaid board member of the European Meningococcal and Haemophilus Disease Society and the German Society for Hygiene and Microbiology, committee for microbial systematics, population genetics and infection epidemiology. SM participated on an unpaid advisory board for Pfizer for the meningococcal type B vaccine in South Africa in 2020. WM received funding from GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer for investigator-initiated research on meningitis B (MenB) strain vaccine coverage. CS received financial support for flights, accommodation, and registration to attend the 2022 ISPPD meeting in Canada. H-CS received funding from Pfizer for a pneumococcal carriage project. H-CS received funding for participation on a data safety monitoring board or advisory board for MSD. LS received personal support from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control for attending the European Scientific Conference on Applied Infectious Disease Epidemiology in 2022. MPGvdL received consulting fees from Pfizer, Merck, and GlaxoSmithKline; payment or honoraria from Pfizer and Merck; and support for attending meetings or travel, or both, from Pfizer. AvG is the chairperson for the National Advisory Group on Immunization of South Africa. NMvS received fees for services and consulting fees from MSD and GlaxoSmithKline, and research funding from the Dutch Health Counsel, US National Institutes of Health, and Amsterdam University Medical Centers, and from MSD and GlaxoSmithKline, which are all directly paid to the institution. NMvS holds a patent (WO 2013/020090 A3) on vaccine development against Streptococcus pyogenes. NMvS is an unpaid scientific adviser to the ItsME foundation, and a scientific adviser to the StrepAotearoa New Zealand project but fees are paid to the University of Amsterdam. NMvS holds personal stocks in Genmab. JY received payments for lectures given at scientific meetings organised by MSD and Pfizer; received support from MSD and Pfizer to attend national and international scientific meetings; and participated in advisory boards for MSD and Pfizer. DS is supported by an Oxford Clarendon Scholarship. All other authors declare no competing interests.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Streptococcus pneumoniae invasive disease case counts For each country or territory, weekly invasive disease cases from Jan 1, 2018, to Jan 2, 2022 (four complete International Organization for Standardization years), were plotted against the weekly Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker stringency index value in 2020–21. The vertical dashed line indicates the week in which pandemic response measures were initiated in each country. *Many of the Spanish sampling dates were submitted only by month and not day of sampling, so the sampling date was entered as the first day of the month if the actual sampling day was unavailable.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Interrupted time-series analyses of invasive disease data in the northern and southern hemispheres Observed cases of invasive disease for each bacterial species (blue solid lines) were plotted against the counterfactual weekly number of cases predicted by the ARIMA models (red dashed lines) if the COVID-19 pandemic had not occurred. The black vertical dashed line indicates the modal month (ie, the most common month when containment measures were put in place). The grey shading depicts 95% prediction intervals. Streptococcus agalactiae data were only collected in the northern hemisphere, and data are plotted by weeks in the calendar year rather than International Organization for Standardization year. The numbers next to ARIMA in the first set of parentheses indicate which components have been included to generate the counterfactual (p,d,q), while the second set of parentheses provides an indication of the seasonal model used (P,D,Q). The square brackets indicate that the model is generated using monthly data (12 months in a year). Please see text for details. ARIMA=autoregressive integrated moving average.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Risk of invasive disease during the pandemic for each bacterial species by hemisphere Results of the meta-analysis are shown as fixed-effects model estimates for each bacterial species.
Figure 4
Figure 4
Streptococcus pneumoniae invasive disease cases by serotype and patient age (A) Distribution of serotypes responsible for 90% of all reported cases between 2018 and 2021, listed by case count, increasing or decreasing trend year by year, and percentage change of each serotype recovered in 2018–19 compared to 2020–21 (average number of cases each year, pre-pandemic vs during the pandemic). (B) Heat map depicting the number of cases of each serotype recovered per year and by age group. ND=not determined.
Figure 5
Figure 5
Haemophilus influenzae and Neisseria meningitidis invasive disease cases by serotype, capsule group, country, and age Distribution of serotypes between 2018 and 2021 for Haemophilus influenzae (A) and Neisseria meningitidis (B) are shown, listed by case count, increasing or decreasing trend year by year, with percentage change of each serotype recovered in 2018–19 compared to 2020–21 (average number of cases each year, pre-pandemic vs during the pandemic). Heat maps depicting the number of cases of each serotype recovered per year and by age group are shown for H influenzae (C) and N meningitidis (D). Number of cases of H influenzae by country are shown (E), displaying only those countries where at least 100 cases in total had been reported across all four study years. Circles represent the total number of cases each year, and lines indicate the increasing or decreasing trend year by year, with all serotypes depicted by the dashed line and H influenzae serotype b (Hib) depicted by the solid line. ND=not determined.

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