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. 2023 Nov:97:104827.
doi: 10.1016/j.ebiom.2023.104827. Epub 2023 Oct 7.

Characterization of highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 mink influenza viruses

Tadashi Maemura  1 , Lizheng Guan  1 , Chunyang Gu  1 , Amie Eisfeld  1 , Asim Biswas  1 , Peter Halfmann  1 , Gabriele Neumann  1 , Yoshihiro Kawaoka  2
Affiliations

Characterization of highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 mink influenza viruses

Tadashi Maemura et al. EBioMedicine. 2023 Nov.
No abstract available

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Conflict of interest statement

Declaration of interests GN and YK are co-founders of FluGen. YK is funded by a Research Program on Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases (JP21fk0108552 and JP21fk0108615), by a Project Promoting Support for Drug Discovery (JP21nf0101632), by the Japan Program for Infectious Diseases Research and Infrastructure (JP23wm0125002), and by the Japan Initiative for World-leading Vaccine Research and Development Centers (JP233fa627001) from the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development. YK has received unrelated funding support from Daiichi Sankyo Pharmaceutical, Fuji Film (Toyama Chemical), Tauns Laboratories, Shionogi, Otsuka Pharmaceutical, KM Biologics, Kyoritsu Seiyaku, Shinya Corporation, and Fuji Rebio. All other authors declare no competing interests.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
Virulence and transmissibility of clade 2.3.4.4b mink H5N1 viruses in ferrets. Ferrets (three per group) were inoculated with 106 plaque-forming units (PFU) of A/mink/Spain/22VIR12774-13_3869-2/2022 (H5N1, mink 3869-2), A/mink/Spain/22VIR12774-14_3869-3/2022 (H5N1, mink 3869-3), or A/Isumi/UT-KK001-01/2018 (H1N1, H1N1pdm) virus. One day later, naïve animals were placed into cages that allowed air flow, but no direct contact between the infected and exposed animals. Nasal swab samples were collected at the indicated timepoints and virus titers were determined by performing plaque assays with MDCK cells. ∗Ferrets met euthanasia criteria. †Ferrets were euthanized on Day 10 post-infection or Day 9 post-exposure, respectively, because the virus infection had cleared. The dotted line indicates the detection limit (1.0 log10 PFU/ml).
See this image and copyright information in PMC

References

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