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. 2023 Dec 12;2(12):pgad386.
doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad386. eCollection 2023 Dec.

Russia's attacks on civilians strengthen Ukrainian resistance

Henrikas Bartusevičius  1 , Florian van Leeuwen  2 , Honorata Mazepus  3 , Lasse Laustsen  4 , Andreas Forø Tollefsen  1   5
Affiliations

Russia's attacks on civilians strengthen Ukrainian resistance

Henrikas Bartusevičius et al. PNAS Nexus. .

Abstract

The all-out Russian invasion of Ukraine commencing in February 2022 has been characterized by systematic violence against civilians. Presumably, the commanders of Russian forces believe that, for example, the bombing of residential buildings will force Ukrainians to lay down their arms. We ask whether military attacks against civilians deter or, in contrast, motivate resistance against the attackers. Two-wave probability surveys were collected in Ukraine in March and April 2022 (Ns = 1,081 and 811, respectively). Preregistered analyses indicate that perceptions and experience of military attacks (victimization) did not decrease Ukrainians' motivations to resist the invading forces. The analyses suggest that victimization positively relates to motivations to join military combat in defense positions. Military attacks against civilians are morally impermissible and prohibited under international humanitarian law. Our results suggest that such attacks are also counterproductive from a military perspective.

Keywords: Ukraine; resistance; victimization; violence; war.

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Figures

Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
Descriptive statistics and formulations of questions used to measure outcome (Panel A) and predictor variables (Panel B). Both panels show percentage frequency distributions for all respondents of waves 1 and 2 who provided replies.
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2.
Self-reported frequency of attacks against family/friends overlayed by the incidence of attacks coded by the data project VIINA (11). Color coding represents self-reported scores (1 = never, 2 = once, 3 = 2 to 4 times, 4 = 5 to 10 times, 5 = more than 10 times) averaged over oblasts (administrative units). Circles represent VIINA-coded attacks (all types). Respondents in Crimea and Sevastopol were not accessed.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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