An evolutionary game study on the collaborative governance of environmental pollution: from the perspective of regulatory capture

Abstract

Local governments have been captured by enterprises and, thus, have relaxed environmental regulations. This phenomenon has occurred repeatedly and has resulted in serious environmental pollution, posing an enormous threat to public health. To solve this problem, this study introduces central environmental protection inspection and media supervision and considers the economic preferences and environmental preferences of local governments. A four-party evolutionary game model composed of enterprises, local governments, the central government and the media is constructed, and the equilibrium solution of four-party replicator dynamics equations is obtained. The influence of relevant parameters on the choice of strategies of the four main bodies is simulated by using MATLAB software to explore the paths and measures for overcoming regulatory capture and to further improve the modern environmental governance system. The results show the following: First, local governments are easily captured by large enterprises. Second, the central government can improve the environmental behavior of local governments by reducing their economic preferences and strengthening punishment. Third, compared to the penalties imposed by the central government, those imposed by local governments have a more significant impact on the environmental behaviors of enterprises. Fourth, compared to the use of an environmental protection tax policy or a tax relief policy alone, the combination of the two has a more significant impact on the environmental behaviors of enterprises. Fifth, central environmental protection inspection and media supervision can improve the environmental behaviors of both local governments and enterprises, and the effect of media supervision is better than that of central environmental protection inspection. This study recommends improving the performance evaluation system for local governments to coordinate economic development and environmental protection, ensuring that local governments assume the main responsibility, using a combination of incentive and constraint policies for enterprises, and increasing the environmental protection inspection and media supervision of local governments and enterprises to resolve the dilemma of regulatory capture in environmental pollution through the simultaneous enhancement of the environmental behavior of local governments and enterprises.

Keywords: collaborative governance; environment and public health; environmental pollution; four-party evolutionary game; regulatory capture.

Figure 1

Evolution trajectory of $K_{16}\left(0\text{,}0\text{,}0\text{,}0\right)$ .

Figure 2

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $F_2=8,F_3=12$ .

Figure 3

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $F_2=10,F_3=14$ .

Figure 4

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $F_2=12,F_3=16$ .

Figure 5

The impact of changes in environmental tax rates $\alpha$ on enterprise behavior.

Figure 6

The impact of the changes in F₁ on the enterprise’s behavior.

Figure 7

The impact of changes in the tax reduction ratio $\beta$ on enterprise behavior.

Figure 8

The impact of changes in $\alpha$ and $\beta$ on enterprise behavior.

Figure 9

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $p_1=0.5,p_2=0.5$ .

Figure 10

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $p_1=0,p_2=0.8$ .

Figure 11

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $p_1=0.5,p_2=0.5,F_3=15,k=2.4$ .

Figure 12

The impact of changes in $G$ on media behavior.

Figure 13

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $\theta =1.6,B_1=5,B_2=5$ .

Figure 14

Tetragonal evolution diagram for $\theta =1.8,B_1=10,B_2=10$ .