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. 2024 Jul;65(7):707-711.

Suspected aerosol transmission of swine pathogens: A field case

Robert Desrosiers  1 , Edward Kluber  1
Affiliations

Suspected aerosol transmission of swine pathogens: A field case

Robert Desrosiers et al. Can Vet J. 2024 Jul.

Abstract
in English, French

A swine production system had 3 sections located a few kilometers apart. Sections A and C contained several thousand sows and nursery and finishing pigs. Section B, located between the other 2 sections, was the smallest and had 6 finishing sites and 2 sow sites. The entire system was infected with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, and Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae. Section B was depopulated, cleaned, disinfected, and repopulated with negative gilts. Despite extreme measures, recontamination occurred for each pathogen, with aerosol considered the most plausible contamination source.

Transmission suspectée d’agents pathogènes porcins par aérosol : un cas de terrainUn système de production porcine comportait 3 sections situées à quelques kilomètres l’une de l’autre. Les sections A et C contenaient plusieurs milliers de truies et de porcs en maternité et en finition. La section B, située entre les 2 autres sections, était la plus petite et comptait 6 sites de finition et 2 sites de truies. L’ensemble du système était infecté par le virus du syndrome reproducteur et respiratoire porcin, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae et Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae. La section B a été dépeuplée, nettoyée, désinfectée et repeuplée de cochettes négatives. Malgré des mesures extrêmes, une recontamination s’est produite pour chaque agent pathogène, les aérosols étant considérés comme la source de contamination la plus plausible.(Traduit par Dr Serge Messier).

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Figures

FIGURE 1
FIGURE 1
Schematic overview of the 3 sections within the swine production system.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

References

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MeSH terms

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