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. 2024 Sep;57(11):1870-1901.
doi: 10.1177/00104140231204229. Epub 2023 Oct 13.

Voters and the IMF: Experimental Evidence From European Crisis Countries

Evelyne Hübscher  1 , Thomas Sattler  2 , Markus Wagner  3
Affiliations

Voters and the IMF: Experimental Evidence From European Crisis Countries

Evelyne Hübscher et al. Comp Polit Stud. 2024 Sep.

Abstract

IMF interventions are often associated with rising political discontent in countries where the Fund intervenes. Studies examining this relationship, however, face the challenge of disentangling the impact of the IMF from the impact of the crisis that triggered the intervention. To address this challenge, we conduct survey experiments in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain and directly assess how voters evaluate the costs and benefits of an IMF intervention. We find that voters believe that the crisis will more likely be solved when the IMF intervenes, but they are also critical of the corresponding loss of national sovereignty. Because the former consideration, on average, dominates their assessment, IMF interventions increase the support of voters for unpopular economic policies. Nonetheless, cross-country differences suggest that continued public support for intervention hinges on the IMF's ability to deliver on its promise to help resolve the crisis.

Keywords: conditionality; credibility; fiscal austerity; international organizations; public opinion; sovereignty.

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Conflict of interest statement

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Proportion of hard versus soft conditions demanded by the IMF; Source: Kentikelenis et al. (2016) and own collection of data (for Spain).
Figure 2.
Figure 2.
Reform conditions by policy dimensions (in %); Source: Kentikelenis et al. (2016) and own analyses.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Reform conditions by policy dimensions (in absolute numbers); Source: Kentikelenis et al. (2016) and own collection of data (for Spain).
Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Distribution of IMF conditionality across different levels of voter approval for austerity package.
Figure 5.
Figure 5.
Effect of IMF conditionality on voter approval for austerity package.
Figure 6.
Figure 6.
Treatment effects, by voter-level characteristics.
Figure 7.
Figure 7.
Treatment effects on mediators, by country.
Figure 8.
Figure 8.
ACME for each mechanism, by country.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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