Convergence of reputations under indirect reciprocity

Abstract

Previous research has shown how indirect reciprocity can promote cooperation through evolutionary game theoretic models. Most work in this field assumes a separation of time-scales: individuals' reputations equilibrate at a fast time scale for given frequencies of strategies while the strategies change slowly according to the replicator dynamics. Much of the previous research has focused on the behaviour and stability of equilibria for the replicator dynamics. Here we focus on the underlying reputational dynamics that occur on a fast time scale. We describe reputational dynamics as systems of differential equations and conduct stability analyses on their equilibria. We prove that reputations converge to a unique equilibrium under a solitary observer model for each of the five standard norms and whether assessments are public or private. These results confirm a crucial but previously understudied assumption underlying the theory of indirect reciprocity for the most studied set of norms.

Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Indirect reciprocity; Reputations; Social norms.