Illusionism Big and Small: Some Options for Explaining Consciousness

Abstract

Illusionism is a general philosophical framework in which specific theories of consciousness can be constructed without having to invoke a magical mind essence. The advantages of illusionism are not widely recognized, perhaps because scholars tend to think only of the most extreme forms and miss the range of possibilities. The brain's internal models are never fully accurate, nothing is exactly as the brain represents it, and therefore some element of illusionism is almost certainly necessary for any working theory of consciousness or of any other property that is accessed through introspection. Here I describe the illusionist framework and propose six specific theories. One purpose of this article is to demonstrate the range of possibilities in a domain that is not yet sufficiently explored. The second purpose is to argue that even existing, popular theories, such as the integrated information theory or the global workspace theory, can be transformed and greatly strengthened by adding an illusionist layer. The third purpose is to argue that when illusionist logic is used, even very disparate theories of consciousness that emerge from unrelated conceptual origins begin to converge onto a deeper, unified understanding.

Keywords: attention; consciousness; global workspace; illusionism; integrated Information; visual awareness.

Figure 1.

Highly schematized account of the transformation from visual input to verbal output. Light reflecting from an apple (Item 1) is transduced into neural signals. The neural information is rendered into an embedding or a model (Item 2) which consists of a complex pattern of activity among neurons. The visual model influences a higher cognitive network (Item 3) that incorporates semantic embeddings. The higher cognitive network influences a speech network (Item 4) that constructs the correct neuronal output signals to activate speech muscles and produce Bob's verbal utterance.

Figure 2.

Highly schematized account of the transformation from an unknown Item 1 to the verbal claim that conscious experience is present. In Hypothesis 1, Item 1 is a magical mind essence. In Hypothesis 2, Item 1 does not exist. In Hypothesis 3, Item 1 is the integration of information. In Hypothesis 4, Item 1 is Item 3, in a recursive loop. In Hypothesis 5, Item 1 is attentional enhancement. In Hypothesis 6, Item 1 is the deep, selective processing of information in the brain, which is associated with integrated information, the global workspace, and attention.

Figure 3.

Arrow A and Arrow B. Arrow A is the first explanatory gap. How can physical neurons give rise to an ethereal feeling? Arrow B is the second, equally important, explanatory gap. Once the feeling is generated, how does it then physically impact neuronal activity, such that it can be transduced into a neural embedding or a model, such that higher cognition can form the semantic idea that it is present, such that people can say that they have it?

Figure 4.

The causality is broken without Arrow B. If the brain has no mechanism for detecting conscious feeling, such that it can no longer be represented in a neural code, then people have no way to think about or talk about that consciousness. Without Arrow B, when people form the semantic idea that they have conscious experience, when they say they have conscious experience, and when they describe specific properties and features of conscious feeling, none of those events are based on an actual conscious feeling generated by the brain. Theories that propose an Arrow A but ignore Arrow B are not explanatory.