Breaking the Wheel, Credibility, and Hermeneutical Injustice: A Response to Harris
- PMID: 39618515
- PMCID: PMC11607036
- DOI: 10.1007/s13347-024-00828-7
Breaking the Wheel, Credibility, and Hermeneutical Injustice: A Response to Harris
Abstract
In this short paper, I respond to Keith Raymond Harris' paper "Synthetic Media, The Wheel, and the Burden of Proof". In particular, I examine his arguments against two prominent approaches employed to deal with synthetic media such as deepfakes and other GenAI content, namely, the "reactive" and "proactive" approaches. In the first part, I raise a worry about the problem Harris levels at the reactive approach, before providing a constructive way of expanding his worry regarding the proactive approach.
© The Author(s) 2024.
Conflict of interest statement
Competing InterestsNot applicable.
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