Illusionism, Moore, and Chalmers
- PMID: 39635709
- PMCID: PMC11614715
- DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1449314
Illusionism, Moore, and Chalmers
Abstract
In 1939, G. E. Moore presented his famous proof of an external world. In 2018, David Chalmers published his Moorean argument against illusionism. In 2022, Chalmers argued that Moore's original argument was wrong. In this paper, I will try to defend the original Moore's argument against Chalmers-style criticism, and show that Chalmers's Moorean argument against illusionism cannot refute illusionism.
Keywords: Chalmers; Moore; consciousness; illusionism; proof of an external world; the Moorean argument.
Copyright © 2024 Loginov.
Conflict of interest statement
The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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