IEM explained
- PMID: 40201578
- PMCID: PMC11974913
- DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2024.2359493
IEM explained
Abstract
In this paper I compare my account of IEM to another one, the Simple View, according to which a judgment is IEM just in case its grounds do not include an identity. The Simple View does not say why no identity assumption is needed to ground the singular judgment in the IEM cases; my account is meant to complement it by providing an answer to that question. According to my account, the judgments that are IEM are based on a certain experience, and what they are about is pre-determined by the mode of that experience, by the type of experience it is, in a way that leaves no room for an alternative.
Keywords: Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM); de se; experience; first person; indexical concepts; mode.
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Conflict of interest statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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