The Theory of Constructed Emotion: More Than a Feeling

Abstract

A recently published article by van Heijst et al. attempted to reconcile two research approaches in the science of emotion-basic emotion theory and the theory of constructed emotion-by suggesting that the former explains emotions as bioregulatory states of the body whereas the latter explains feelings that arise from those state changes. This bifurcation of emotion into objective physical states and subjective feelings involves three misleading simplifications that fundamentally misrepresent the theory of constructed emotion and prevent progress in the science of emotion. In this article we identify these misleading simplifications and the resulting factual errors, empirical oversights, and evolutionary oversimplifications. We then discuss why such errors will continue to arise until scientists realize that the two theories are intrinsically irreconcilable. They rest on incommensurate assumptions and require different methods of evaluation. Only by directly considering these differences will these research silos in the science of emotion finally dissolve, speeding the accumulation of trustworthy scientific knowledge about emotion that is usable in the real world.

Keywords: affect; basic emotion; emotion; predictive processing; theory of constructed emotion.

Figure 1.

Typological and population thinking in the science of emotion arranged as a continuum. Typological thinking in the science of emotion assumes that each folk emotion category, such as FEAR, is a biological and/or psychological type (e.g., a genetically inherited adaptation with its own unique neural assembly, family of facial expressions and physiological patterning, and/or function). Accordingly, the features of any occurrence of FEAR have inherent emotional meaning. Instances of FEAR can vary somewhat from one another, but they are assumed to share a family resemblance to a stable set of prototypic features that define them as FEAR and not members of some other emotion category. Typological thinking uses reductionism as a scientific strategy. Phenomena, such as instances of FEAR, might vary from one another in their facial expressions, their physiological patterning, and so on, but it is assumed that this variation can be best understood in terms of simpler, more fundamental causes. Accordingly, typological thinking utilizes simple cause-and-effect mechanisms. Scientific studies are designed to find within-category similarities and between-category differences. Some variation within a category is permitted, as is overlap between categories (i.e., fuzzy boundaries), but the instances are assumed to retain sufficient family resemblance to their category prototype and sufficient difference from the prototypes of other categories. Context is assumed to moderate what is inherently biological; life experience, normal stochasticity, differences in the triggers for emotion, emotion-regulation efforts, and cultural norms for expressing emotion, such as, for example, display rules or cultural dialects, have all been proposed as moderators that tweak or otherwise add variation to universal expressive tendencies. Lived experience, such as being socialized within a given culture, is assumed to play no substantive role in the transition and evolution of emotion categories. Typological thinking assumes that the categories of reality, such as categories of emotion, exist independently of any human mind and are fixtures of reality to be discovered (i.e., emotion categories are perspective-independent), called “traditional realism.” At the other end of the continuum, population thinking assumes that FEAR and other emotion categories are constructed dynamically in a fully contextual and situated manner. One situated category for FEAR can vary substantially from another. Emotion categories, as situated constructions, are not genetically inherited adaptations, although their ingredients evolved via both natural selection and epigenetic influences. Lived experience, such as being socialized within a given culture, is assumed to play a key role in the transmission and evolution of emotion categories. The features of any occurrence of FEAR, such as physiological changes, facial movements, and so on, derive their emotional meaning relationally within the larger ensemble. No stable and immutable prototype exists for FEAR or any other emotion category. Population thinking uses holism as a scientific strategy. Instances of FEAR are expected to vary substantially from one another in their facial expressions, their physiological patterning, and so on, and emerge from complex causation. Scientific studies are designed to observe and model variation that is structured within spatiotemporal contexts (and the physical condition of the body is an important source of context). Context is assumed fully causal, on par with any genetic influences that are inherited via natural selection. Population thinking assumes that every category of FEAR and the other categories of reality are perspective-dependent, called “relational realism” (Barrett & Theriault, 2025).