Quantifying the impact of a broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine in a future SARS-X pandemic
- PMID: 41006237
- PMCID: PMC12475435
- DOI: 10.1038/s41467-025-63399-x
Quantifying the impact of a broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine in a future SARS-X pandemic
Abstract
COVID-19 has underscored the need for more timely access to vaccines during future pandemics. This has motivated development of broad-spectrum vaccines providing protection against entire viral families, which could be stockpiled and deployed rapidly following detection. Using mathematical modelling, we assess the utility of a broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine during a hypothetical SARS-X outbreak, for a range of implementation strategies including ring-vaccination, spatial-targeting and mass vaccination of high-risk groups. Broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine ring- or spatial strategies alone are insufficient to contain epidemics driven by a SARS-CoV-2-like virus, but when paired with rapid isolation and quarantine, can achieve containment of a SARS-CoV-1-like virus. Where suppression fails, broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine utilisation still reduces the effective reproduction number and slows epidemic growth - buying valuable time for health-system response and virus-specific vaccine development. Vaccination of high-risk populations with the broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine ahead of virus-specific vaccine availability could reduce mortality and enable shorter and less stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions to be imposed; results are sensitive to vaccine properties (e.g., efficacy), health system capabilities (e.g. rollout speed) and timeline to virus-specific vaccine availability. Our modelling suggests that broadly protective sarbecovirus vaccine delivery to those aged 60+ years could have averted 21-78 % of COVID-19 deaths during the pandemic's first year, depending on the size of the stockpile. Realising this potential impact will require investment in manufacturing, delivery capacity and equitable access ahead of future pandemics.
© 2025. The Author(s).
Conflict of interest statement
Competing interests: The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) funded the investigation into the impact of the 100 Days Mission. Authors maintained full freedom when designing the study and deciding on additional scenarios to explore. ACG has received personal consultancy fees from HSBC, GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi and WHO related to COVID-19 epidemiology and from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for work unrelated to COVID-19. ACG was previously a non-remunerated member of a scientific advisory board for Moderna and is currently a non-remunerated member of the scientific advisory board for the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness. OJW has received personal consultancy fees from WHO for work related to malaria. ABH has received personal consultancy fees from WHO for work related to COVID-19, and grant funding for COVID-19 work from WHO and NSW Ministry of Health, Australia. ABH is a member of the WHO Immunization and vaccines related implementation research advisory committee. CW has received personal consultancy fees from SecureBio for work relating to novel pathogen surveillance and from Blueprint Biosecurity for work relating to pandemic preparedness. CWT and LFW and FZ are co-inventors of multiple patent applications on development of pan-sarbecovirus vaccines and human-nAbs. All other authors declare no competing interests.
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References
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- World Health Organization (WHO). COVID-19 deaths dashboard. WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard. https://data.who.int/dashboards/covid19/deaths?n=c.
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