How Oedipus falsifies Popper: psychoanalysis as a normative science

Abstract

The scientific status of psychoanalysis has been the subject of continual debate. Influential philosophers of science have challenged the form of its theories and the nature of the evidence offered on their behalf. Some have concluded that the theories are beyond testing--i.e., they can neither be confirmed nor refuted, and psychoanalysis is thus intrinsically unscientific, akin to pseudosciences such as astrology. From that body of criticism, I have chosen for examination and rebuttal the issue of falsifiability. I refute the charge that psychoanalysis is not scientific because its theories are not "falsifiable." On the contrary, I show that psychoanalysis contains theories which make strong and unequivocal statements that are subject to the test of possible falsification. This capacity has been concealed and the falsifiability criticism rendered plausible because of the normative judgments which are latent in discussions of human development and human society. In explicating these judgments, I will move from the philosophy of science to the anthropology and sociology of science (and of the professions). The normative character of psychoanalytic science reinforces the ethical code of the therapeutic profession, a combination which imposes a disciplinary rigidity of the theoretical system.