Explanation in the hermeneutic science

Abstract

Using clinical vignettes, we first examine the idea that psychoanalysis is, in Gill's (1991) phrase, a hermeneutic science--hermeneutic because it interprets meanings, scientific because the meaning connections it deals with are also usually causal connections. Next we explore some aspects of the structure of the kinds of explanation distinctive to psychoanalysis. Three kinds are distinguished: conveyance of content explanations, which have been central in the accounts of some recent philosophers of psychoanalysis, and two kinds of explanation in terms of intentionality, in terms, that is to say, of what the psychic states in question are about. One deals with forward-looking states such as wishes, in which the state is about some future, sought-after state of affairs such as a wish-fulfilment; the other deals with backward-looking psychic states such as memories, in which the state to be explained is about some earlier experience, fantasy, or whatever, one often quite unknown to the analysand prior to analysis. The paper concludes by making a quick case for the idea that good explanations in terms of meaning or intentionality often also identify the cause of the psychic states being explained.