Taiwan's transition from high fertility to below-replacement levels

Abstract

This article compares the fertility experience of Taiwanese in the eight years since the total fertility rate reached 2.1 with that before fertility reached replacement levels. During the earlier period, two-thirds of the fertility decline resulted from falling marital fertility and one-third from higher age at marriage. The changing age distribution retarded this decline. Since 1983, the further decline to 1.7-1.8 has been entirely the result of the trend toward later marriage. Older age distributions now facilitate the decline. Births postponed by those marrying later make the conventional TFR misleading. Computation based on parity-progression ratios raise TFRs from 1.7 to 2.0, a number less alarming to policymakers. Contraceptive prevalence is at saturation levels in all major populations strata. The "KAP-GAP" has disappeared. What would have happened without Taiwan's effective family planning program is impossible to determine, but clearly, contraceptive services supplied by the program were the major proximate cause of Taiwan's fertility decline.

PIP: In Taiwan, even though fertility in 1991 was 1.6, indicating below replacement fertility, the crude birth rates were still higher than the crude death rates. Zero population growth will occur in 2023, when the age distribution of reproductive age women will stabilize at replacement level. The main trends in fertility and nuptiality have indicated large fertility declines among women aged 30-34 years and older since 1983. The proportion currently married at age 15-19 years and 20-24 years has declined sharply during the period 1956-91. Fertility was highest among women aged 25-29 years, and nuptiality decline in this age group has had considerable impact on fertility. Marital fertility affected 66% of fertility decline, and nuptiality affected 33% of fertility decline. Between 1983 and 1991, nuptiality decline alone accounted for the crude birth rate decline. Another feature of change has been the increase in marital fertility among women aged 15-19 years and the decrease in marital fertility among women aged 20-24 years. The mean length of a generation reached 27.2 years by 1991. The shift to later childbearing might lessen the concern about too low fertility. There has not been a shift to greater childlessness or only children. The fertility pattern has reflected a shift to a greater concentration of fertility in a short time period. The percentage decline in the total fertility rate was reflected in Taipei, all cities, and urban and rural townships by 1991. Wife's education has been strongly correlated with fertility since 1966. By 1991, all educational differences were removed. The increasing levels of education among women assured the rapid transition. If 1983 educational levels had remained constant, fertility would have only declined by 10%. The main features prior to 1991 were a changing age/sex structure due to fertility decline, a rising marriage age, period effects of marriage postponement, and a rapid rise in educational levels. Family surveys have shown fertility to have been larger than preferences in 1985 and to reflect persistent son preference; contraceptive need was fulfilled by 1991. In 1992, a new population policy was formulated to attain replacement level fertility. Regardless of the projections, the proportion of older persons will rise. Pro- and anti-natalist influences on growth exist. The small stem family has been and will likely continue to be the popular family type.