Explaining homosexuality: philosophical issues, and who cares anyhow?

Abstract

Standard behavioral and biological attempts to explain the etiology of homosexuality are surveyed. These include genetic, physiological (e.g., hormonal), constitutional (e.g., wrong pubic hair configurations), childhood experience, parenting, and psychoanalytic accounts. These are criticized from a number of perspectives, including inadequate conceptualization of homosexuality and heterosexuality. The use of path analysis to assess etiological accounts is examined, with particular attention being paid to the Kinsey Institute's Sexual Preference efforts. Drawing from the sociology of science, recent philosophical work on the growth of scientific knowledge, and historical considerations, the legitimacy of homosexual etiology as a scientific research question is examined. It is argued that homosexual etiology is a degenerative research program. The research program's conceptual crudity with respect to sexual identity and sexual orientation precludes it from making any scientific contribution. Thus the claim that homosexual etiology is a legitimate scientific issue is plausible only against the background of a set of late Victorian normative assumptions about "normal love," some surrogate thereof, or a political agenda. Implications of the homosexuality etiology case study for more general philosophical treatments of explanation are considered briefly.