On the neurophysiology of consciousness: Part II. Constraining the semantic problem
- PMID: 8521253
- DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1020
On the neurophysiology of consciousness: Part II. Constraining the semantic problem
Abstract
The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness (more precisely, what I call C) depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalamus (hereafter, ILN). This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I (Bogen, 1995). This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II should be read in conjunction with Part I.
Comment in
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Tutorial commentary: surprisingly small subcortical structures are needed for the state of waking consciousness, while cortical projection areas seem to provide perceptual contents of consciousness.Conscious Cogn. 1995 Jun;4(2):159-62. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1021. Conscious Cogn. 1995. PMID: 8521254
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Visual awareness and the thalamic intralaminar nuclei.Conscious Cogn. 1995 Jun;4(2):163-6. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1022. Conscious Cogn. 1995. PMID: 8521255 No abstract available.
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The intralaminar thalamic nuclei: subjectivity pumps or attention-action coordinators?Conscious Cogn. 1995 Jun;4(2):167-71. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1023. Conscious Cogn. 1995. PMID: 8521256 No abstract available.
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Thalamic contributions to attention and consciousness.Conscious Cogn. 1995 Jun;4(2):172-93. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1995.1024. Conscious Cogn. 1995. PMID: 8521257 Review.
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